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Abstract
Transnational security threats are among the most pressing and complicated problems
facing both governmental and non-governmental actors in today’s world. Human
trafficking is one example of contemporary transnational security threat that is relatively
less studied compared to other transnational security threats. Because transnational
security threats such as human trafficking exist above and outside the boundaries of state
control, it may be supposed that a greater degree of supranationalism in the policy
responses to them would yield better results in combatting these modern-day ills. Antitrafficking efforts from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the European
Union are examined to assess the impact of degree of supranationalism present in the
respective policy responses to determine if any advantage is gained from aligning
supranational policies to transnational problems. This question is not answered
conclusively due to a lack of supranationalism present in key areas of EU governance
responsible for law enforcement efforts.
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Chapter One: Introduction

Human trafficking is modern day slavery. Human trafficking is a term that is
applied to a broad family of crimes in which individuals are deprived of their most basic
freedoms so that they may be exploited in various ways for the profit of others. Just like
other forms of slavery throughout the ages, human trafficking causes unspeakable
suffering for those who fall victim to it. Sadly, the number of individuals who do fall
victim to it is enormous. No reliable numbers exist for the incidence of trafficking, but
various organizations put the number as high as 25 million victims around the world.
The human cost of this new form of slavery requires little explanation, and it is not the
focus of this paper. In this paper I will discuss human trafficking as a policy problem that
has to be addressed through governmental means- specifically on a regional level because
of the transnational nature of the problem.
This paper frequently mentions human trafficking in relation to the generic
category of transnational crime that also includes broad subjects like drug trafficking,
weapons trafficking, cyber crime, money laundering, and terrorism. Moving up one
morel level of categorization, we can place transnational crime in the broad category of
non-traditional security threat. This macro-category includes such diverse and
complicated subjects as pollution, water supply, and migration. The complexity of these
non-traditional security threats makes them inherently inter-disciplinary, requiring study
by various combinations of the physical and social sciences. One field of scholarship
cannot offer complete solutions to these problems on its own, but each can offer its own
1

insights that may help develop a comprehensive understanding of each of these various
problems.
This paper is being written under the belief that these inter-disciplinary security
threats, such as transnational crime, have a political dimension that should be examined
from the perspective of political science. To narrow the subject of the paper, a certain
variety of transnational crime—human trafficking—will be specifically examined. Little
attention has been given to addressing human trafficking with the methods of political
science.
This paper examines the basic research question of whether or not a regional
governmental organization such as the EU, which is characterized by a high degree of
supranationalism, will have more success in combating a transnational problem such as
human trafficking, than will a purely intergovernmental regional organization such as
ASEAN, which lacks any significant supranationalism in its governance. The initial idea
informing this research question was the expectation that symmetry between
supranationalism in regional governance and the transnational character of a problem
would translate into a sort of supranationalism dividend. Presumably, this dividend would
manifest as greater success in fighting the transnational problem. From this initial
research question and its corresponding assumptions, I derived the basic hypothesis that
the more supranational a region’s governance is, the more effectively it should be able to
combat the trafficking threat.
To examine this hypothesis, I conducted two comparative case studies between the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the European Union. The two regions are
2

natural choices for comparison because they represent the most intergovernmental and
supranational regional organizations in the world today. This key difference provides a
sort of real world laboratory in which we can isolate the key variable of supranationalism
in governance, in order to see if more of it means more success fighting transnational
problems.
Obviously, Europe and Southeast Asia are different not just in the way their
respective regional organizations have evolved. The two regions differ in significant
ways in most areas of comparison such as politics, wealth, and degree of common
identity. Despite these differences, their respective human trafficking problems are
similar enough that they can be compared in a way that still allows us to isolate the key
variable of degree of supranationalism in governance. The in depth examinations of both
regions’ human trafficking problems in chapters three and four will firmly establish this.
Chapter two of this paper will contain sections offering the reader a survey of
human trafficking as modern slavery and transnational crime, as well as the professional
literature on it. These first sections of the chapter will be followed by a discussion of
Mitranian functionalism as it relates to this study, and finally with sections on research
design and a discussion of the independent variables associated with the hypothesis.
Chapter three is the ASEAN case study which offers a brief explanation of human
trafficking as it exists specifically to SE Asia, before going in depth in relating
functionalism to ASEAN and its steadily developing efforts to rally its member states
against human trafficking. The chapter will finish with a discussion of the limits of
intergovernmentalism in fighting transnational threats like human trafficking and the
3

related question of whether or not supranationalism seems to have much of a future in SE
Asia.
Chapter four is the EU case study, which begins similarly to the ASEAN one with a
history of human trafficking in Europe, as well as the EU’s still-evolving response to it.
The chapter will go on to discuss the specifics of the EU’s anti-trafficking policy
response, as well as specific political obstacles that this response has encountered. The
chapter will conclude with an analysis of EU anti-trafficking policy through the lens of
advocacy network theory, in addition to functionalism.
In the conclusion, I will restate and review the key points of the study and offer
final thoughts on its validity, usefulness and directions for future research on the question
of supranationalism in regional governance and how it relates to fighting transnational
security threats.
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Chapter Two: Background and Research Design

As stated above, human trafficking is a problem that can fruitfully be examined
through many different disciplinary lenses. For the most part, the phenomenon has
escaped the attention of political science, leaving the academic literature on the topic
relatively sparse compared to other problems of this gravity. The vast majority of
research and analysis on the topic of human trafficking is produced by policy
practitioners from both governmental and non-governmental organizations. The best
work on human trafficking is generally put out by organizations like the US Department
of State, various United Nations bodies, as well as small and large NGOs. An academic
literature review will necessarily look somewhat like a background survey of the
problem.

Defining and Documenting the Phenomenon
Multiple definitions of human trafficking exist, even among the multiple
governmental and non-governmental organizations that combat it. What all of these
definitions have in common is that they recognize human trafficking as modern day
slavery. Trafficking is a process of enslavement by means of deception, coercion, or
outright violence. Actual movement of the victims is incidental and does not define the
crime, although it does frequently characterize its common practice.
The United States Department of State, the lead organization in the US’s
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interagency efforts against human trafficking, defines human trafficking1 as follows:
Trafficking in persons is modern-day slavery, involving victims who are forced,
defrauded or coerced into labor or sexual exploitation. Annually, about 600,000 to
800,000 people -- mostly women and children -- are trafficked across national
borders which does not count millions trafficked within their own countries.
People are snared into trafficking by many means. In some cases, physical force is
used. In other cases, false promises are made regarding job opportunities or
marriages in foreign countries to entrap victims.2

The US Department of Justice defines human trafficking as follows:
Trafficking in persons — also known as "human trafficking" — is a form of
modern-day slavery. Traffickers often prey on individuals who are poor, frequently
unemployed or underemployed, and who may lack access to social safety nets,
predominantly women and children in certain countries. Victims are often lured
with false promises of good jobs and better lives, and then forced to work under
brutal and inhuman conditions. It is a high priority of the Department of Justice to
pursue and prosecute human traffickers. Human trafficking frequently involves the
trafficking of women and children for sexual exploitation, a brutal crime the
Department is committed to aggressively investigating and prosecuting. Trafficking
also often involves exploitation of agricultural and sweatshop workers, as well as
individuals working as domestic servants.3

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime defines human trafficking
similarly, but with one significant difference. The UNODC definition follows the “fraud,
force, and deception” criteria but also states “Human trafficking is a crime against
humanity.”4

1. The terms “human trafficking” and “trafficking in persons” are used interchangeably, with the
latter being preferred by most US government sources; the former term will generally be used in this paper.
2. US Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, “Facts About Human Trafficking,” 2004,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/rls/33109.htm (accessed April 5, 2008)
3. US Department of Justice, “What We Do,” under “Fight Human Trafficking Web Page,”
http://www.usdoj.gov/whatwedo/whatwedo_ctip.html (accessed April 5, 2008)
4. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “UNODC and Human Trafficking,”
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/index.html (accessed April 1, 2008)
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Amnesty International’s definition of human trafficking echoes those above:
“Trafficking is modern day slave trading. It involves transporting people away from the
communities they live in by the threat or use of violence, deception or coercion so they
can be exploited as forced or enslaved workers. When children are trafficked, no
violence, deception or coercion needs to be involved: simply transporting them into
exploitative conditions constitutes trafficking.”5
What all of these definitions have in common is the recognition of several key
factors about human trafficking. First, all definitions acknowledge the role that force,
coercion, and fraud play in trafficking. This single factor is critical to distinguishing
human trafficking from the crime of human smuggling, in which individuals willfully and
knowingly enter into commercial transactions to be transported illegally across borders.6
In the crime of trafficking, the actual physical transportation of the victim is irrelevant.
Force, coercion and fraud determine the presence of the crime.
Second, both US government definitions explicitly identify human trafficking as
slavery. This equation of human trafficking to slavery is central to the opposition toward
trafficking that is an increasingly established norm within the international community.
The UNODC definition is notable for identifying human trafficking specifically as a
crime against humanity. With this language comes a distinct set of set of legal
implications. Crimes against humanity are crimes against all- erga omnes-7 and therefore

5. Amnesty International, Trafficking in Persons: Amnesty International Fact Sheet (New York)
6. US Department of State, Distinctions Between Human Smuggling and Human Trafficking,
(Washington, DC, 2006)
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prosecutable by all. This is significant in light of pending US legislation,8 but less so for
ASEAN and EU policy.
Throughout the last decade awareness of human trafficking has grown enormously
throughout the world among journalists, activists, various international organizations, and
to a lesser degree academics. This increase in awareness has occurred most notably
within the policy community, to include the governmental entities and international
organizations that seek to combat the crime. Arguably the most influential publication in
the field is the US Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report, first
published in 2001, as mandated by the then recently passed Trafficking Victims
Protection Act. The Report has grown considerably since its inception, from about 100
pages in 2000, to over 300 pages in 2009. The growth of the Report reflects not only a
steadily deepened understanding of a once unknown phenomenon but also the improved
access to resources available to US government anti-trafficking entities, of which the
State Department is the lead agency.
The development of understanding of human trafficking in policy circles has been
encouraged by the TIP Report, but this knowledge increase is an international effort.
Although the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime under its previous director
Antonio Maria Costa received frequent criticism from governmental and nongovernmental quarters about its alleged infectiveness in directly fighting transnational
7. Beck’s Law Dictionary, http://people.virginia.edu/~rjb3v/latin.html (accessed May 1, 2008).
Beck’s offers the following definition of erga omnes: "toward all," or as “wrongful acts that harm everyone
and not simply one injured party.”
8. Trafficking in Persons Accountability Act of 2007, S. 1703, 110th Cong., 2d sess., 2007,
introduced by Sen. Richard Durbin. Passed senate on 1 October 2008, referred to House Judiciary
Committee on 2 October 2008. Bill seeks aggressive extraterritorial jurisdiction, but not universal
jurisdiction.
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crime, it none the less is responsible for two major publications (among many others)
which have added meaningfully to our understanding of human trafficking as a multidisciplinary phenomenon which straddles the worlds of criminology, policy, economics,
and sociology. These two papers, published in 2006 and 2009, both provide a reliable
global overview of a complicated issue.9 As with the Department of State’s reports, the
UNODC’s two major efforts also show a maturation of understanding and methodology.
Though not anti-trafficking or anti-crime organizations per se, two other prominent
international organizations, the International Labor Organization and the International
Organization for Migration also conduct serious data collection and research on matters
related to human trafficking, notably on forced labor and high-risk migration. The ILO’s
in depth studies and statistical databases on labor conditions, pay and other indicators
deal with labor abuse, especially of children, that can overlap with actual trafficking or
slavery conditions. The IOM’s excellent research into migration patterns of job seekers,
both lawful and irregular, provides an excellent basis for understanding the political
economy of human trafficking.
As with other non-traditional, transnational security threats, such as ecological
problems, human trafficking has attracted the attention of numerous non-governmental
organizations of various sizes and capabilities. Both Amnesty International and Human
Rights Watch track the issue, providing information papers, short fact sheets, and in
depth studies on the subject. These products are reliable, usually current, and represent a
9

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Global Report on Trafficking in Persons (Geneva:
Policy Analysis and Research Branch, UNODC, 2006)
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Global Report on Trafficking in Persons (Geneva: Policy
Analysis and Research Branch, UNODC, 2009)
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good starting point for individuals beginning to study the phenomenon. Subject matter
experts from these two prominent organizations also regularly testify before
Congressional committees to keep relevant lawmakers informed on the subject.
Other, smaller NGOs are also very active against human trafficking, and constitute
some of the more meaningful direct action in support of victims of the crime and against
the traffickers themselves. Polaris Project, a large US-based anti-trafficking NGO, works
worldwide to identify victims, facilitate their rescue, and to provide rehabilitation and reintegration assistance to them. Polaris is also active as a lobbying group, providing
advice to policy makers at the national, state, and local levels in the US. Like many
NGOs that work against trafficking in the US and Europe, Polaris has received
substantial funding from the US government over the years, specifically from the
Departments of Justice and Health and Human Services. Despite cultivating a high level
of expertise on the subject of human trafficking, the group does not publish formal papers
or conduct academic-style studies. This is true for many other trafficking-focused NGOs.
There are literally too many NGOs working against human trafficking to name.
Whether partnered with other NGOs or local, state, or national governments, working
domestically or internationally, secular or faith-based, government funded or not, they are
a crucial component of the modern anti-trafficking policy landscape. Their presence and
dedication makes human trafficking a bit similar to other non-traditional security threats
such as various kinds of environmental degradation that also attract a diversified nongovernmental and activist response. Despite their good work, few of these organizations
are staffed to conduct a lot of serious research on trafficking, though the intelligence that
10

they gather due to their proximity to the crime does aid surveillance of the crime and a
real time ability to track its evolution.
A growing number of scholarly or semi-scholarly books exist on the subject of
human trafficking. Among the best of these are Disposable People: New Slavery in the
Global Economy and Understanding Global Slavery: A Reader, both by contemporary
slavery researcher Kevin Bales. Both books serve as essential reading for those seeking
to understand human trafficking not as a novel form of transnational crime that just
emerged in the last two decades, but as the contemporary continuation of a very old
practice with tangible economic motivations.
The academic approach that Bales takes, while not uniformly present in all books
on trafficking is also present in several texts that analyze trafficking from a
criminological perspective. Helpful texts from this field for those new to the subject of
trafficking are Transnational Threats: Smuggling in Arms, Drugs and Human Life, edited
by Kimberly Thachuk, Smuggling and Trafficking in Human Beings: All Roads Lead to
America by Sheldon Zhuang and The War on Human Trafficking: US Policy Assessed by
Anthony de Stefano. Human Trafficking, Human Misery by Alexis Aronowitz is also a
useful general introduction to the subject. More advanced students of the subject may
benefit from the chapters in Human Trafficking, edited by Maggie Lee.
Although human trafficking likely harms men in similar overall numbers as
women, it has still attained a commonly held reputation as a highly gendered crime. This
gender bias in the crime is sharply apparent in instances of trafficking for purposes of
sexual exploitation. Many works that deal with this inherently salacious topic tend to
11

sensationalize the phenomenon. Others spend much effort trying to convince the reader
of the horror of the crime, something that hardly requires a lot of convincing. These
books are largely geared for lay consumption, or perhaps for the activist community. A
good introduction to the gender-related issues that surround human trafficking is Sex
Trafficking: the Global Market in Women and Children, by Farr. Two of the best
introductions to sex trafficking as a gendered crime are recent Hollywood films. Both
Human Trafficking (2005) and Trade (2007) offer vivid and hard to watch portrayals of
all aspects of human trafficking for sexual exploitation. Although both films tend toward
melodrama, they still offer a near documentary level of adherence to the facts.
Although many fine works of research do exist on the broad subject of human
trafficking, very little work has been done on the subject from a political science
perspective. This is likely because the subject is so clearly a crime, an economic issue, a
women’s issue, etc., that it is easily ignored as a political issue. One specific topic within
the political perspective that seems particularly under-examined is human trafficking as a
transnational phenomenon and its relationship with supranational governance and
transnational policy.

Background on Human Trafficking
Social factors contribute to the presence and acceptance of human trafficking,
particularly the trafficking of women and girls for purposes of forced marriage and
prostitution. 10 In many source and destination countries women remain socially and
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politically disenfranchised, as well as abused in the home.11 Inability to own property
leaves women financially insecure and susceptible to trafficking. In highly patriarchal
societies, women are not seen as equals and may be more readily commoditized in the
minds of men. The sociological factors that are conducive to human trafficking,12
particularly of women and girls are complicated and lie outside the scope of this paper.13
They have been mentioned in passing only to give the reader a more full appreciation of
the numerous and deep challenges that anti-trafficking efforts face globally, and to
suggest the multiple dimensions that a comprehensive anti-trafficking effort requires.
Human trafficking is a largely transnational crime characterized by source, transit,
and destination countries. When human trafficking is mentioned, it often conjures
images of shadowy organized crime syndicates with global reach. While this is true
sometimes, and the role of large transnational crime syndicates in trafficking is proven,
trafficking should not always be assumed to occur on an intercontinental scale. As the
UN Office on Drugs and Crime’s (UNODC) 2009 Global Report on Human trafficking
states that in most reported cases, victims were moved across international borders. This
10. United Nations Interagency Program on Human Trafficking in the Greater Mekong Subregion, Human Trafficking Background Information, under “Resources,” http://www.notrafficking.org/resources_background_what.html (accessed April 13, 2008).
11. Amnesty Interntional, Maureen Greenwood-Basken, Advocacy Director for Eastern and
Central Europe, Amnesty International, in testimony before House Committee on International Relations,
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights and International Operations, 4 May 2006,
http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?lang=e&id=ENGUSA20060504001
12. All China Women’s Federation, “Project to Preventing Trafficking in Women and Children,”
http://www.womenofchina.cn/Projects_Campaigns/Projects/traficking/ (accessed February 13, 2006).
Offers a good summary of this confluence of political, economic, and social factors on its anti-trafficking
page, though the example is specific to China, the patterns it describes are widespread throughout the
developing world.
13. See Kathryn Farr, Sex Trafficking, 2005, in particular chapters 5 and 6 for a good introductory
discussion of the role that economics and misogyny play in fueling human trafficking and the sex trade.
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is consistent with the conventional perception of trafficking as a transnational crime, but
it does not capture every case. The Report also states “cross-border flows are not
necessarily long distance flows. Much of the cross-border trafficking activity was
between countries of the same general region, particularly between neighboring
countries.”14
The international and transcontinental nature of trafficking is further minimized
when cases of debt bondage and forced labor are taken into consideration.15 Debt
bondage may be the most numerically dominant and under-reported type of modern
slavery. Recent ILO estimates have consistently estimated that between 10-25 million
people are held in slavery-like conditions by debt bondage.16 This kind of slavery is most
frequently intrastate. Although trafficking for forced labor is likely numerically larger
than trafficking for sexual exploitation, it is thought to be even more under-reported and
less understood than trafficking for sexual exploitation. From the UNODC’s 2006
trafficking report:
For several years, trafficking for sexual exploitation has dominated discussions
concerning the purpose of human trafficking. Trafficking in persons for forced
labour has not been viewed as a significant issue in many countries, and the
identification of trafficking victims who are exploited through forced labour has
been even less successful than in the case of sexual exploitation.17

Often, the economics supporting demand for trafficked labor are so powerful that

14. UNODC, 2009, 11
15. Debt bondage and forced labor are very similar types of slavery. Debt bondage is a type of
forced labor that relies on debt, imagined or actual as a justification for holding a person in slavery-like
conditions. All debt bondage is forced labor, but not all forced labor is debt bondage.
17. UNODC, 2006, 65
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they will obscure major forms of trafficking, like forced labor, as policy questions.
Rather than interdicting the flow of cheap labor to otherwise legal economic sectors,
governments will focus on the more salacious, black-market only activities that center
around sexual exploitation, generally of women and girls. Considering the forced labor
component of modern human trafficking is an important opening to examine human
trafficking through the lens of political economy.
An Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) working paper
from 2009 discusses the direct linkage between migration and macro economic forces:
People are on the move in part because of political and economic factors associated
with globalization. Driving forces—often labeled ”push“ and ”pull“ factors—
include relative wage and income disparities between countries, socio-economic
dislocation in transition countries, upheaval caused by regime change and war, the
existence of migration networks, and the lower costs of transport and
communication. Driven by macro-trends as large as globalization itself: Two other
phenomena in agriculture – the rise of labour contractors or intermediaries and the
casualization of labour – are closely associated with globalization and increased
migration.18
The push and pull factors driving migration in the age of globalization are also push
and pull factors for human trafficking, which is closely related to irregular migration.
The most recent Trafficking in Persons Report from the US Department of State expands
on the link between market forces and human trafficking: “The last year was marked also
by the onset of a global financial crisis, which has raised the specter of increased human
trafficking around the world. As a result of the crisis, two concurrent trends—a shrinking
global demand for labor and a growing supply of workers willing to take ever greater

18. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Office of the Special Representative and
Coordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, A Summary of Challenges on Addressing Labour
Exploitation in the OSCE Region, Background Paper for the Alliance Against Trafficking in Persons
Conference: Technical Seminar on Trafficking for Labour Exploitation (Vienna: OSCE, 2009)
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risks for economic opportunities—seem a recipe for increased forced labor cases of
migrant workers and women in prostitution.”19 Even without the current global recession,
the two factors identified above are constant in the modern global economy.
Demographics weighted toward young populations in third world countries, combined
with dislocating events like the decline of traditional economic activity and climate
change, create large populations that are highly prone to undertake migration—by
whatever means— to secure economic livelihoods.
Economic pressures and dislocated vulnerable populations alone do not explain
why millions of people find themselves enslaved every year. As the 2009 TIP Report
goes on to say, “the movement to end human trafficking includes significant efforts to
address these factors that ‘push’ victims into being trafficked, but it also recognizes a
‘pull’ factor as part of the cause. A voracious demand fuels the dark trade in human
beings. Unscrupulous employers create demand for forced labor when they seek to
increase profits at the expense of vulnerable workers through force, fraud, or coercion.”20
Understanding trafficking as a political economic issue informs part of the necessary
policy response. The economic drivers of migration referenced above are clear
representations of the three wealth related variables discussed in chapter two.
Last but not least in understanding human trafficking as a political phenomenon is
to consider its security implications. Not only is trafficking a threat to human security,
(that is, the well being of individuals) but it is also a threat to the border and internal

19. US Department of State, Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, 2009
Trafficking in Persons Report (Washington, DC, June 2009), 9
20 Ibid., 31
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security of states. As a security issue, human trafficking can be considered alongside
other transnational threats as diverse as weapons trafficking, terrorism, cyber crime, and
money laundering, among others. Transnational crimes, by definition “cut across
national borders…and are frequently beyond the control of national governments. They
emerge from, and are amplified by, three major trends in the global system.”21 These
trends, characterized by Thachuk, are “globalization of economic activity” and its
accompanying disparities in wealth and economic opportunity, the growing imbalance of
governance between the wealthy capitalist nations (mostly democratic) of North
America, Europe, and East Asia. Second, is the arc of unstable nations running from
North Africa through Southwest Asia and Central Asia and into parts of SE Asia. Third,
“overlapping substantially with the other two, is a widespread increase in ethnic and
religious hatred that fuels terrorism, civil strife, and international conflict.”22
In states affected by human trafficking, individual citizens are deprived of basic
civil rights, border controls and domestic security are undermined, and the criminal
elements responsible for the trafficking are able to grow stronger from the easy revenue
that comes from trafficking. As the 2009 UNODC report indicates, a slight majority of
groups involved in trafficking also seem to be involved in other forms of crime, domestic
and transnational. Because of this overlap, the enormous profits generated by trafficking
fuel other kinds of crime, both within and across borders. Trafficking directly subverts
national governments by undermining their ability to protect their citizens and control

21. Kimberly Thachuck, ed., Transnational Threats: Smuggling and Trafficking in Arms, Drugs,
and Life (Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2009), 6
22. Ibid., 6-7
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their territorial sovereignty. In a Westphalian sense, trafficking (and all other
transnational crime) undermines basic statehood.
One of the conditions that is partially responsible for the dramatic rise in human
trafficking over the last two decades is that it is so profitable and so low risk for
criminals. A lack of laws against human trafficking as a specific offense in many
countries meant that trafficking cases were rarely identified by law enforcement, the
traffickers rarely prosecuted, and when they were, they usually faced lesser charges such
as prostitution or pandering. Authorities were unable to combat a phenomenon that did
not officially exist. Just a decade ago, this policy vacuum existed in every country in the
world. As trafficking began to become more visible throughout the late 1990s,
momentum grew, notably in the US and within the UN General Assembly, to formalize
and criminalize the offense.
Following a decade of build-up during the 1990s,23 on January 8, 2001 the
General Assembly passed Resolution 55/25 that formally adopted the UN Convention
Against Transnational Organized Crime.24 Concurrent with the adoption of the
Organized Crime Convention was the adoption of its supplementary Protocol to Prevent,
Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children.25 The

23. Nick Klynn, “Establishing the Legal Basis to Combat Human Trafficking: The Key Role of
the UN’s Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons,” (graduate research paper,
Portland State University, 2008) 3-10. Paper offers a history of the UN’s gradual build-up to the so-called
Palermo Protocol.
24. United Nations General Assembly, Fifty-Fifth Session, Resolution 55/25: United Nations
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, (New York: January 2001),
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/a_res_55/res5525e.pdf (accessed April 2, 2008)
25. United Nations, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, Punish the Trafficking of Persons, Especially
Women and Children (New York: December 2000),
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adoption of the Protocol was a turning point in the fight against human trafficking
internationally, as was the near concurrent adoption of the Trafficking Victims Protection
Act for the United States.26 The Protocol provided the first globally recognized definition
of human trafficking, the purpose of which is to “to facilitate convergence in national
approaches with regard to the establishment of domestic criminal offences that would
support efficient international cooperation in investigating and prosecuting trafficking in
persons cases.”27
The UNODC’s above cited summary is succinct and useful, but the Protocol’s
own language warrants examination. Much like its US counterpart, the TVPA, the
Protocol recognizes that it is filling a legal void, “there is no universal instrument that
addresses all aspects of trafficking in persons.”28 The effect of that sort of legal gap is to
allow trafficking crimes to go unpunished, or under-punished by being prosecuted under
less harsh peonage, smuggling, or labor violation laws.
Failure to distinguish human trafficking as a separate crime also left its victims
without protection or recourse. In most cases, the severely traumatized victim of
trafficking would be arrested and treated as a perpetrator or willing participant in a crime,
rather than as a victim of one. What both the TVPA and the Protocol share in common is

http://www.uncjin.org/Documents/Conventions/dcatoc/final_documents_2/convention_%20traff_eng.pdf
(accessed April 2, 2008). Also known as the “Palermo Protocol” or the simply the “the Protocol.
26. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Public Law 106-386, 106th Cong.
(October 28, 2000), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/10492.pdf (accessed March 30, 2008)
27. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “The United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocols,”
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/index.html (accessed March 30, 2008)
28. Protocol to Suppress, 1
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a victim-centered approach wherein the person trafficked has rights as a victim.
Failing to distinguish and define human trafficking also meant that the
phenomenon could not really be discussed or understood as a function of complex and
interacting social, economic, political, and cultural forces.29 As such, no effort to prevent
it by ameliorating the push or pull factors could be taken.
Additionally, without a proper legal definition or legal understanding of the
crime, law enforcement efforts to combat it would be uneven, at best. The Protocol’s
Article 3 definition will be cited in its entirety:
Trafficking in persons” shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer,
harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other
forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or
of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits
to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the
purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the
exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation,
forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the
removal of organs…30

Article 5 mandates the formal criminalization of human trafficking with the
following language, “each State Party shall adopt such legislative and measures as may
be necessary to establish as criminal offences the conduct set forth in article 3 of this
Protocol, when committed intentionally.”31 With the passage of the Protocol, trafficking
evolved from the void of non-definition to a defined crime that the signatory countries

29. US Department of State, Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, 2008
Trafficking in Persons Report (Washington, DC, June 2008), 28-32. Section contains a brief discussion of
supply and demand in trafficking.
30. Protocol to Suppress, 2
31. Ibid., 3
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were treaty-bound to combat. Human trafficking went, in other words, from nullum
crimen sine lege to the subject of binding treaty law.
The above discussion supports this paper’s efforts to examine trafficking as a
political problem with political solutions. The UN Protocol was the watershed moment
when a nebulously defined and poorly understood phenomenon became a recognized
policy issue within the international community and within international treaty law. As a
subject of treaty law, human trafficking was then able to transition to the domestic
political agendas of more and more countries. By “naming the evil,” so to speak, and
formalizing human trafficking as its own specific offense, national governments were
able to begin to fill the policy vacuum that had enabled the trafficking phenomenon to
grow unabated throughout the preceding decade. Concurrent with trafficking’s
transformation to a normal area of national policy making was its emergence as an issue
of international concern.
As with all clandestine and criminal phenomena, human trafficking is difficult to
study because of the lack of reliable and uniform data on the topic.32 Part of the difficulty
in quantifying human trafficking can be attributed to the clandestine nature of the crime
itself. However this is only part of the picture. Our difficulty in tracking and quantifying
human trafficking is itself an excellent illustration of the policy vacuum that all too often
enabled the growth of the phenomenon in the first place: lack of effective policy and
ignorance of the phenomenon are mutually instantiating. The following excerpt from the

32. From the UNODC’s 2006 report, “Due to its clandestine nature, accurate statistics on the
magnitude of the human trafficking problem at any level are elusive and unreliable,” is a representative
statement.
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UNODC’s 2006 report frames this relationship:
Many countries lack anti-trafficking in persons legislation. Even when
legislation is in place, laws may only define human trafficking as applying to
certain exploitative practices, such as sexual exploitation, and not other forms of
exploitative behavior. Moreover, in many countries, the definition of human
trafficking applies only to the exploitation of women and children overlooking the
exploitation of adult male victims. Further, if comprehensive laws do exist, they are
not always enforced and victims may not be recognized as victims of crime but may
be seen as smuggled migrants. Victims may be hesitant to provide information or
cooperate with authorities often out of fear of harm to themselves or their families
by either criminal networks or the legal authorities. Many countries lack a
centralized agency or coordinated statistics system so that the collection of
trafficking data, if done at all, is done on an ad hoc basis.33

Functionalist Theory
Functionalism is a relatively old piece of integration theory, introduced by David
Mitrany in the1940s. This sixty-plus year lifespan is a simple testament to the robustness
and flexibility of the theory. Although integration theory has developed enormously since
Mitrany wrote The Functional Approach to World Politics in 1948, I found functionalism
to be a useful and appropriate theory for use in this paper.
Functionalism can be reduced to three very basic theoretical statements. First, in
anticipation of the wildly complicated and borderless non-traditional security threats that
the world faces today, Mitrany assumed that the modern era would be increasingly
marked by a growing number of problems that cannot be solved by individual states.
Moreover, these multiplying and complex problems would be of such obscure and
technical natures that only specialists could adequately address them. Politicians, as

33. UNODC 2006, 44
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generalists, would need to delegate problem-solving authority to apolitical technical
specialists.
Second, assuming that the multiplying problems of the modern era would often be
of a borderless nature, these technical specialists would have to interact with each other
to jointly tackle a complicated problem that straddles the borders of their respective
states. Such cooperation, on issues devoid of ideological or nationalistic content would
strengthen the impulse for states to cooperate and bolster the international regimes that
Mitrany saw the nascence of in the post-war period.
Third, because Mitrany expected this international technical cooperation to be
successful, he predicted a sort of positive feedback cycle in which states would pursue
more and more international technical cooperation based on the success of the growing
body of previous efforts. This is the essence of “ramification,” the term that he famously
applied to the process of changing attitudes in favor of cooperation.
Even the above brief explanation of Mitrany’s ideas makes their relevance to
human trafficking clear. Human trafficking is, as we have firmly established, the
quintessential borderless crime. Political and jurisdictional boundaries of all kind are
irrelevant to this blob of a crime. This is not to say that states cannot take meaningful
individual action. National level efforts to care for victims and jail their abusers are of
intrinsic value that no one would argue against. As valuable as these state-level actions
are, they have nonetheless proven insufficient, as the unabated growth of the crime has
grimly proven.
Human trafficking is exactly the kind of problem that Mitrany describes as being
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the target of functionalist cooperation. It is devoid of ideological or nationalistic content.
Democrats and Republicans, Socialists and Christian Democrats, democratic Indonesia
and autocratic Vietnam, see human trafficking as an unconditional wrong, their judgment
unaffected by otherwise divergent political values and practices. Human trafficking exists
in every country in the world and harms people from every possible ethnic background
and walk of life. The harm that the crime causes transcends concerns of national interest
or identity.
It seems that the technical specialists who execute the functionalist cooperation on a
given subject should exist outside of politics, in so far as they ideally are immune to
ideology or cruder political concerns. This is an idealized state of things, and cannot be
taken at face value. If the bureaucrats tasked with solving complicated problems do their
best to remain aloof from the rough and tumble of political life, their bosses will not.
Moreover, no bureaucracy exists in a vacuum. Even the most noble civil servants,
technical specialists ready to tackle the world’s problems, will always find themselves at
the mercy of broader issues and debates in the politics of their respective, and
neighboring, countries. This is glaringly apparent in our case study of the EU in chapter
four. In the case, it is very obvious how sharp political differences concerning
supranational policing severely constrained the development of the functionalist cadre
(Europol, in this case) that would specifically try to combat human trafficking through
law enforcement and intelligence activities. As the case study will demonstrate,
functionalism is alive and well in the European approach to human trafficking, albeit in
an unconventional way and in a form that reflects the way brute politics constrain noble
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aspirations toward functionalist cooperation.
Functionalism’s relationship with SE Asian regionalism is less well known than
its relationship with European regionalism. When the Bangkok Declaration establishing
ASEAN was signed by the original five members in 1967, colonialism was a very near
memory for most.34 Unsurprisingly, sovereignty, non-interference and decision-making
by consensus rather than by mandate, emerged as the guiding principles of ASEAN’s
member states in their interactions with each other. These principles were initially
enshrined in The ASEAN Declaration (The Bangkok Declaration), signed August 8,
1967. In the Declaration’s preamble, it is stated that the States “are determined to ensure
their stability and security from external interference in any form or manifestation in
order to preserve their national identities.”35 This is repeated in the 1976 Treaty of Amity
and Cooperation in SE Asia. Article 2 of the Treaty states that “mutual respect for the
independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all
nations” is a “fundamental principle.” Article 10 of the Treaty reiterates this, stating that
States Party “shall not in any manner or form participate in any activity which shall
constitute a threat to the political and economic stability, sovereignty, or territorial
integrity of another [state].”36 Over the decades, these principles have become deeply
held regional norms, referred to as the so-called “ASEAN way.” These fundamental
assumptions about sovereignty and non-interference are the basis for all of ASEAN’s
political activity.
34. Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand
35. ASEAN, The ASEAN Declaration, (Bangkok, 1967)
36. “Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia.”
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In the forty years that ASEAN has been extant, none of its member states, despite
some rather acrimonious and violent shared histories, have come to blows with each other
while they were part of ASEAN.37 As former ASEAN Secretary General, Rodolfo
Severino said, “By not forcing its incredibly diverse and mutually suspicious members
into legally binding standards, ASEAN has done the remarkable job of moving its
members from animosity to the close cooperative relationship that they enjoy today, a
relationship in which violent conflict is all but unthinkable.”38 If the ASEAN way has
been conducive to peace, then it has also been conducive to inaction. A common
illustration of this nowadays is ASEAN’s increasingly embarrassing inability to
discipline Burma’s despotic regime. Less pointedly, it can be hard to get things done, to
push through a needed policy, when nodding consensus is the order of the day. Because
of this, ASEAN battles a “talk shop” image. The question that arises from ASEAN’s
consensus decision making is how to accomplish joint policy action, on a regional scale,
without compromising the sovereignty or national integrity of its member states, which to
this day remain wary of binding rules-based integration. An answer is found in the
functional approach.
The functional approach is very well suited to the limitations and character of
ASEAN’s political culture. Essentially, the functional approach refers to a need-

37. ASEAN, “The Founding of ASEAN,” under “About Asean,”
http://www.aseansec.org/7069.htm (accessed August 19, 2008). The essay on the page recounts the
following: “It was while Thailand was brokering reconciliation among Indonesia, the Philippines and
Malaysia over certain disputes that it dawned on the four countries that the moment for regional
cooperation had come or the future of the region would remain uncertain.”
38. Rodolfo Severino, “The ASEAN Way and the Rule of Law,” (speech, University of Malaya,
Kuala Lumpur, September 3, 2001).
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centered, non-constitutional, and flexible means of solving policy problems that affect
more than one otherwise independent political entity. Within the functional approach,
sovereignty is retained, “except in so far as it was pooled for a specific joint functional
undertaking.”39 The functional approach is non-constitutional not in the sense that its
products violate the constitutions of the involved states; rather it is non-constitutional in
the sense that it is does not require alteration to legal statutes or votes in legislatures.
Legalisms are not at work in the functional approach- need is. As Mitrany notes, “by its
very nature the constitutional approach emphasizes the individual index of power; the
functional approach emphasizes the common index of need.” He follows by saying,
“there are many such needs which cut across national boundaries.”40
Mitrany was not speaking of SE Asia, but his words are very applicable to the
region in contemporary times. SE Asia today faces a host of problems, the nontraditional security threats mentioned above, that cut across the national boundaries of the
region. ASEAN identifies many of them, including poverty, migration issues, pollution
and various forms of transnational crime, including terrorism, and of course, human
trafficking.41 This is consistent with Mitrany’s basic idea that states facing shared
transnational problems should engage in transnational problem solving.

39. David Mitrany, “The Functional Approach to World Organization,” International Affairs
(Royal Institute of International Affairs) 24, no.3 (July 1948), 355, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3018b652
(accessed July 27, 2009).
40. Ibid., 356
41. ASEAN, “Transnational Issues,” ASEAN Secretariat Website,
http://www.aseansec.org/4964.htm (accessed July 20, 2009). The ASEAN Secretariat’s website has a
comprehensive archive of documents detailing ASEAN’s positions on a host of topics that it places under
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Functionalism’s suitability to the ASEAN way does not stop with its limited
pooling of sovereignty or transnational and need based nature. Five aspects of
functionalism are most applicable to ASEAN. What Mitrany designates as “political
approaches” are mutually exclusive. On the other hand, “functional schemes are at best
complementary each helping the others, and at worst independent of each other.”42
Successive efforts build upon each other, generating a growing body of best practices and
enhanced professional capacities amongst practitioners.
Related to this cumulative effect, is the flexibility inherent in the functional
approach. This flexibility exists in two main forms. First, the success of one effort is not
necessarily predicated on the success of other concurrent or preceding efforts, “one may
live and prosper even if other fails or are abandoned.”43 Especially attractive for
countries in a consensus based regional organization, is the fact that a state “could take
part in some schemes and perhaps not in others, whereas in any political arrangement
such divided choice would obviously not be tolerable.”44 This case-by-case selection has
an obvious downside in that some schemes will be under-supported. However, just as
likely to be the case is that participation for other schemes will be greater than if a state
had to commit to a broader, and potentially more controversial, policy scheme.
Finally, policy schemes that follow the functional approach are less susceptible to
so-called “mission creep” or to politically motivated power grabs. This is because the
the “transnational issues” heading. Topics listed are environment, “transboundary haze”, crime and
terrorism, legal matters, immigration, and drugs.
42. Mitrany, 357
43. Mitrany, 1948, 357
44. Ibid., 358
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“nature of each function tells itself the scope and powers needed for its effective
performance. All these elements are capable of concrete measurement, and unlike rigid
political they are therefore capable of concrete adjustment.”45 A state may commit to a
functional scheme with some confidence that their effort will address the specified
challenge only, without digressing. If participation does become unsatisfactory for this,
or another reason, then withdrawal is as easy as recalling one’s representative to the
effort.
ASEAN’s foundational documents provide a basis for, or even indicate a
conscious inclination toward, the functional approach. The Bangkok Declaration cites
“mutual interests and common problems,” in its preamble and goes on to discuss joint
efforts in economic and social development, as well as various kinds of technical and
scientific assistance as central aims of the organization.46 This functionalist language is
expanded in the Treaty of Amity, Article 6 of which states that Parties will “continue to
explore all avenues for close and beneficial cooperation with other States.”47
“The advent of regionalism reflects the disintegration of the concert of power as
guarantor of security.”48 Although conventional security was a motivating factor in the
formation of ASEAN,49 Southeast Asia, and the security challenges that it faces have

45. Ibid., 358
46. ASEAN, The ASEAN Declaration, (Bangkok, 1967). Second section, paragraphs 1, 3, 4, and
5 contain the most functionalist oriented language.
47. ASEAN, Treaty of Amity, 1976
48. Haas, 1956, 239
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changed a lot in the half-century that ASEAN has been around. The security concerns
that ASEAN seems most focused on now are not the results of state aggression, but of
global forces, ever increasing in complexity and breadth of challenge. Ecological crises,
transnational crime, and poverty threaten ASEAN’s member states more persistently and
acutely than any foreign armies currently do. And it is to these challenges that ASEAN
directs its efforts at regional, functional cooperation. Former ASEAN Secretary General,
Rudolfo Severino wrote:
In Asean's eyes, the concept of security goes beyond such potential [traditional]
conflicts and tensions. It involves problems that transcend national boundaries
and, under today's conditions, are more plausible threats to the region. These have
to do with the dangers to the regional environment, piracy, robbery and other
crimes at sea, drug trafficking, trafficking in human beings, communicable
diseases, natural disasters and terrorism. The networks that Asean has built among
authorities—and, in some cases, civic groups—dealing with these questions have
provided mechanisms for cooperation.50

A noticeable degree of conformity is present between the language and ideas of
Mitrany and the general values and characteristics of ASEAN. What remains to be
determined is whether ASEAN’s actual anti-trafficking policies exhibit a similar degree
of conformity with the functional approach. This will be examined in detail in chapter
three.
Neofunctionalism, the extension of functionalism that was developed by notable
scholars like Ernst Haas, Robert Keohane, and Joseph Nye, among others, is a natural

49. ASEAN, The ASEAN Declaration, (Bangkok, 1967). Second aim of the Association is to
“promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the
relationship among countries of the region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter.”
50. Rudolfo Severino, “Asean in need of stronger cohesion,” Singapore Straits Times, December 9
2006.
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candidate model for both cases. Since much of neofunctionalist thought developed with
European integration in mind, I will not go into its applicability to the EU case study.
Haas’s postulate that elite expectations for material gain, or other pragmatic
considerations, will determine the level of support that they show for integration is
applicable to ASEAN. Elite expectations for wealth or material gains could be viewed as
an important source of current efforts to form a free trade area in SE Asia, as well as
other aspects of the Vision 2020 plan, discussed in chapter three. This argument of
Haas’s could be touched upon during the portion of chapter three where the linkage is
made between unaddressed non-traditional security threats and potential impediment to
Vision 2020. Moreover, Haas believed that the integration gains made under this
pragmatic self-interest could be rolled back if they were not based on deeper political
values.51 Indeed, it seems that integration cannot develop past the threshold of
supranationalism in ASEAN, where the most deeply held political values continue to be
sovereignty and non-interference. ASEAN elites may not have the ideational
commitment needed to cede sovereignty for supranational cooperation. This problem is
explored at the end of chapter three.
Other well-known neofunctionalist concepts like spillover and its subsequent
variations could also likely be applied numerous cases within the recent policy histories
of the EU and ASEAN. The decision not to pursue neofunctionalism as an analytical
model within this paper is not a denial of its utility and applicability.

51. James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of International Relations: a
Comprehensive Survey, 5th ed., (New York: Longman, 2001) 512-15.
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Hypothesis and Research Design

By conducting a comparison of the respective anti-trafficking efforts of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the European Union, this paper originally
sought to explore the question of whether or not a loosely integrated, intergovernmental
organization such as ASEAN has the capacity to create and implement policies that
meaningfully combat human trafficking, or whether the deeply integrated, partially
supranational character of the EU is better suited, if not necessary, to fight human
trafficking. Put differently, what was initially being asked was if a supranational set of
policies is required to adequately combat a truly transnational policy problem, in this case
a specific sort of transnational crime.
The paper’s hypothesis is that because human trafficking, as an example of a nontraditional security threat, is transnational by nature, then the more supranational a
region’s governance is, the more effectively it should be able to combat the trafficking
threat. The benefit of symmetry between supranationalism in governance and policy on
one hand, and of the transnational nature of the problem on the other hand, was
intuitively thought to be ideal for addressing the problem.
The EU and ASEAN were chosen as comparative cases because although they are
both regional organizations, they are very different. European regionalism is twenty
years older and comprised of relatively wealthy and democratic nations that share a
greater degree of common cultural inheritance. ASEAN is a younger organization,
comprised of less mature nation states with very different levels of economic
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development, widely different systems of government, and diverse ethno-linguistic
backgrounds. The EU is a partially supranational organization with strict formal rules
governing integration, whereas ASEAN remains an intergovernmental organization
governed by informal and consensus-based decision-making. The EU is the most
supranational example of a regional organization that actually exists and that can be used
as a real world example, whereas ASEAN represents a very intergovernmental and
informal organization that nonetheless possesses a definite sense of regional community
and identity. In terms of degree of supranationalism present, the two regional
organizations are the most opposite examples of legitimate regional organizations that
exist in the real world. Because of this key difference, the key independent variable of
degree of supranationalism in governance is able to be isolated fairly well. Although the
regional organizations are different, their respective trafficking problems are not so
different that they cannot be compared.
Because I hypothesized that a higher degree of supranational governance would be
more effective at remedying transnational threats, the key independent variable that is
expected to influence the incidence of trafficking in each region is the degree of
supranationalism embodied by each regional organization. Other independent variables
influence the incidence of trafficking as well. Variables that will be accounted for are:
wealth of the component states of each region; wealth disparity between neighboring
states in the regions; and the related question of government type in the countries.
Through the two regional case studies it became apparent that the countries within
the EU and ASEAN are similarly afflicted by human trafficking. Contrary to commonly
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held assumptions about the unique severity of SE Asia’s trafficking problem, both
regions have widespread trafficking problems that are driven by many of the same
factors. Human trafficking is a nebulous and highly localized crime that sometimes
manifests in unique ways in different parts of the world. Recognizing this, it is still clear
that certain basic conditions enable the crime in nearly identical ways across all regions
of the globe, thus facilitating the comparison in this paper.
Given the general similarities in the two regions’ trafficking problems the EU’s
policy response to trafficking should be more sophisticated and effective on account of
the EU’s greater wealth, general political maturity, and of course, level of supranational
integration. The EU’s greater wealth and political maturity, coupled with the expected
dividends from the assumed supranationalism-transnationalism symmetry should
translate to human trafficking in Europe being more effectively curtailed than in SE Asia.
Nothing about European trafficking explains why the EU has not had more success
in fighting it. That is, because European human trafficking is not inherently more
complicated or severe than in SE Asia, how come the wealthier and more supranational
EU has not had more success in fighting the problem? The explanation that I identify for
why Europe has not had success more commensurate with its wealth, supranationalism,
and overall capacity is the asymmetry between the law enforcement response and the
threat itself. The criminals who perpetrate the crime operate transnationally with no
regard for borders or jurisdictions. Europe’s police do not.
An analogy that is helpful to explain this imbalance between policy and problem is
to picture the state of anti-mafia prosecutions in the United States without a federal law
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enforcement and prosecutorial capability. Imagine the jurisdictional and coordination
problems if the state governments of New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania, along
with county and city police organizations, were responsible for coordinating operations
against mafia groups. A similar lack of cross-border capability exists in Europe. Despite
the efforts of Helmut Kohl to raise the issue in the early 1990s, there is no “European
FBI.” Such a supranational capability proved too controversial, as we will see in chapter
four. There is incongruence between the region’s overall level of supranational
integration and its policy in the particular area of transnational crime. This explains why,
most of the other variables being equal or inconclusive, we don’t see a better response
from the more integrated and wealthy region. The EU may have plenty of
supranationalism in its governance, just not in a key area concerning human trafficking
(or other transnational crime).
As mentioned above, this paper’s hypothesis was that because human trafficking,
as an example of a non-traditional security threat, is transnational by nature, then the
more supranational a region’s governance is, the more readily it should be able to combat
the non-traditional security threat, in this case, human trafficking. Multiple independent
variables are involved in this hypothesis, the most significant of which is the degree of
supranationalism present in the governance of the two regions. An important feature of
the case studies is characterizing the place that the regional organizations and their antitrafficking policies occupy on the intergovernmentalism–supranationalism spectrum, as
well as discussing how well each region’s anti-trafficking response conforms to the
expectations of functionalism. Other independent variables that have to be taken into
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account are the wealth of the regions’ component states, intraregional disparities in
wealth, interregional wealth disparities, differences in political systems and the presence
of civil society in the regions. This section will explain these five independent variables
and how they affect the hypothesis and the dependent variable of incidence of trafficking
in a region.
The first issue in this discussion is the concept of supranationalism itself.
Supranationalism in the regional bloc is regarded as they key independent variable
because it was expected, above all other factors, to influence the transnational nature, and
therefore the expected efficacy of the respective policy responses from the EU and
ASEAN.
A casual comparison between the EU and ASEAN will quickly raise the simple
observation that the EU, while not purely supranational by any means, contains many
more significant supranational characteristics than ASEAN. Most notable of these is the
economic and monetary union adopted by the EU in the Treaty on European Union in
1991 and implemented in 2000. The economic and monetary union of some of the
world’s largest and most advanced economies by itself would make the Eurozone the
most supranational of all regional blocs in the world. The partial but significant
supranational character of European integration is further reinforced by the centrality of
the supranational European Commission in the actual administration of the EU and by the
central (albeit limited) role of the European Parliament in legislating and in budgetary
concerns.
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European supranationalism is not a fact across the board. Certain policy areas are
conspicuously resistant to supranational authority, notably immigration policies, policing,
and defense matters. These areas, among others, remain under the purview of the EU’s
intergovernmental body, the European Council, or individual Member States. However
incomplete Europe’s supranational integration may be, it nonetheless is the world’s most
supranationally integrated region and by far the most tightly integrated regional
government in the world. Because of this, it was chosen as one of the cases here, and as
the most perfect example of real world supranationalism that could be incorporated into a
case study.
At the other end of the supranationalism-intergovernmentalism spectrum lays the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Unlike the EU, ASEAN does not have any of
the supranational institutions of governance that characterize Europe, although eventual
monetary union is a recurrent theme among ASEAN political elites. When regional
governance is achieved in ASEAN it is done so through purely intergovernmental means.
ASEAN’s regional governance might be better described as coordinated and cooperative
rather than unitary and integrated. Developing greater supranationalism in SE Asia has
been a recurrent question in ASEAN at least since the region’s collective trauma during
the financial crisis of the late 1990s. While the benefits of tighter integration are widely
discussed and recognized by many ASEAN political elites, it is opposed by just as many
and remains a distant goal.
Despite its purely intergovernmental nature, ASEAN as a regional governance
body is real, and a sense of shared purpose does exist, centered on core ASEAN values
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like respect for sovereignty, regional development, and peaceful resolution of conflict.
These “ASEAN values” are more than mere talking points; they appear to be deeply held
values that have developed into uniformly held regional political norms over the last forty
years. This genuine sense of SE Asian political identity is also evidenced by the manner
in which ASEAN is used as a diplomatic identity to deal with the rest of the world.
Loose and intergovernmental as it is, ASEAN is a genuine regional governmental
organization, and one whose strong intergovernmental character makes it a useful
counterpoint to the EU.
Although the ASEAN and EU case studies allow us to gain a definite sense of
what the balance is between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism in the two
regions’ respective anti-trafficking policies, quantifying this balance is difficult at best.
Accepting the imprecision of my conclusions on this point, a surprising finding became
clear. The EU, despite being a much more tightly integrated regional government, with
substantial supranational characteristics, had not produced a more supranational
governmental policy response to trafficking—at least not directly—than loosely
integrated ASEAN. That is, the European Commission itself is not organizing and
directly managing a pan-regional effort to stop human trafficking, as might be expected
by a functionalist approach. Europol is not a “European FBI.” The economic,
governmental, and intellectual resources of Europe, per se, are not centrally leveraged on
a transnational, continental scale against a transnational security threat. The EU is
squandering its supranationalism in this specific respect. The only way that the
supranational European Commission is able to act supranationally in regard to human
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trafficking, and implement a transnational response, is by proxy through the recruitment
of civil society actors. This will be detailed in chapter four.
Though imperfect and insufficient, the EU’s use of civil society to execute a
transnational policy response is more supranational than anything yet seen from ASEAN;
after all, the impetus, money, and coordination come from the Commission. A limit still
exists to what can be accomplished by non-governmental means in addressing nontraditional security threats. To fight trafficking or other transnational crime in a
transnational, rather than nationally centered way, a supranational law enforcement and
intelligence body must exist that can operate across state borders with the powers to
arrest criminals and collect information on them.
Second to the degree of supranationalism as an expected influence on the ability
of the two organizations to respond to the human trafficking threat, is wealth. The
question of wealth has three aspects. Absolute wealth, as might be measured by
aggregate GDP, GDP per capita, or GNI is the most basic measure. By any measure, the
states and individual citizens of the EU have more money than their counterparts in SE
Asia. Only Singapore and Brunei rival European states in economic indicators. Absolute
wealth is important to this paper for two reasons. First, in both the case of SE Asia today
and Europe in the early 1990s (and to a lesser degree still today), poverty is a factor in
making people vulnerable to irregular migration and/or trafficking. Second, a state’s
wealth can reasonably be expected to limit its policy options to respond to a given
problem. This is seen clearly in the EU case. Despite having severe limitations placed
on the degree to which it could act supranationally against trafficking, the Commission
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was able to do something—fund the Daphne policy series—because it had tens of
millions of Euros to direct toward the effort. Money was effectively used to create
supranational governance where actual supranational governmental action was not
possible.
Absolute wealth is an inconclusive variable. Human trafficking exists in every
single country in the world, from the poorest of the poor in South Asia and sub-Saharan
Africa to the wealthiest European, NE Asian, and North American countries. Moreover,
in some cases populations—especially young women—find themselves more vulnerable
to trafficking after experiencing increases in community or family wealth. This perverse
outcome occurs because of rising expectations for material affluence that are leveraged
by traffickers. More important than the absolute wealth of a community or individual are
the disparities between neighboring communities and states.
Europe, whether in the immediate post-Soviet years or now, and SE Asia, both
give very clear illustrations of the role that wealth disparities between neighbors have in
driving irregular migration and in making individuals more vulnerable to trafficking.
Whether from Poland to Paris in 1992, or from Burma to Thailand today, a relatively
wealthy neighbor—regardless of how poor or rich in absolute terms—makes an
attractive destination. The wealth imbalance is enough to trigger migration, and
migration coupled with immigration restrictions, as strongly suggested by the IOM
research discussed in chapter two, puts people at risk to be victimized by criminals who
exploit migration. Thus, intraregional wealth disparity is a very significant independent
variable that influences the dependent variable in the paper (overall degree of severity of
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trafficking in a given region). Both SE Asia and Europe—although existing at different
levels of development—exhibit intraregional wealth imbalances that influence their
respective trafficking problems in nearly identical ways.
Interregional wealth is the third aspect of wealth that has to be accounted for.
Interregional wealth is very similar to intraregional wealth, but extrapolated upwards.
That is, Europe is a destination for victims from Central Asia the same way Thailand is a
destination for victims from Burma. Interregional wealth affects the dependent variable
because richer regions tend to be destinations for transcontinental trafficking patterns, but
it does not affect the degree of supranationalism in a region’s governance, nor does this
variable make SE Asian or European trafficking markedly different from one another.
The last two variables of degree of democratization and presence of civil society
are more challenging to frame. Government type, that is the presence of liberal or
illiberal governments in the two regions, does not clearly affect the dependent variable.
What this means for this paper is that the comparability of the two case subjects (ASEAN
and the EU) is supported even though their member states have such different
government types. Human trafficking affects every country in the world. Some of the
world’s biggest democracies and most liberal states with strong regard for individual
rights are also among the largest destination countries for slaves, as are some of the most
politically backwards and autocratic. Even liberal republics like the US and some
parliamentary democracies in Europe have internal trafficking patterns that victimize
their own citizens. In SE Asia this fact is more obvious. Citizens from a democracy like
the Philippines and an autocracy like Burma both find themselves trafficked and
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enslaved, whether abroad or in their own borders. An unstable monarchy like Thailand
can be a source and destination for trafficking flows, as can a more stable one party
dictatorship like Vietnam. In Europe, liberal Netherlands’ own struggle with human
trafficking was a major signal event that helped raise awareness about the problem within
Europe while the illiberal states of the former Soviet Union supplied victims for the slave
demand in its western democratic neighbors.
Understanding government type as a driver of human trafficking, as a factor
affecting our dependent variable, involves many qualitative factors. Relevant questions
might be does the government’s illiberal abuses make people want to migrate by any
means necessary or does the government’s poor ability to provide public order make its
territory a safe haven for criminal organizations that conduct trafficking operations.
These are legitimate research questions that fall within the purview of political science,
but are complicated enough that they warrant separate field research of their own.
As with some of our wealth variables, government type can be assumed to affect a
government’s ability to respond to any given problem, though this cuts both ways and
does not clearly favor democracies or autocracies. An autocratic government might be
assumed to be able to deal more effectively with criminals because it could arrest
suspects without due process and execute them at its discretion, options not available to
liberal democracies, especially in Europe where the death penalty is outlawed.
Conversely, a democratic state might have more disciplined and less corrupt police,
prosecutors, and judges thus allowing for more elaborate and widespread antiracketeering cases to be developed against criminal organizations. In the case of Europe
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versus SE Asia no advantage or disadvantage attributable to national government type is
discernible for either region in its fight to address trafficking as a transnational crime on a
regional basis.
An open question that I cannot answer is whether or not national government type
influences the degree of a region’s supranational integration. The more supranational EU
is made up of parliamentary democracies, but I cannot address the causality of this. Is the
EU more supranational because its member states are democracies? This paper treats
government type of the region’s component states as an inconclusive factor in terms of
the key independent variable. Moreover, the differences in government type between the
EU and ASEAN member states do not influence the nature of the two regions’ trafficking
problems. Government type’s utility to this paper is just to reinforce that the two regions
are comparable.
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Chapter Three: ASEAN

Background on Trafficking in SE Asia
Trafficking can be difficult to differentiate from other kinds of irregular migration
within the region, such as illegal but voluntary cases of human smuggling. In some
cases, the traditional nature of regional, or national culture can make trafficking difficult
to discern from traditional practices such as buying brides. Such traditional practices also
stimulate the market for trafficked women. UNICEF estimates that “at least 22,000
women have been trafficked to China to be wives, sex workers or housemaids since
1991,” most of them from neighboring ASEAN countries.52 Corruption among local
officials who ignore to the practice, and the lack of surveillance capacity in regional law
enforcement further hinder the tracking and elimination of the practice.
Additionally, the large volume of cross-border exchanges, most of which are
legitimate, provide a natural camouflage for trafficking activities throughout SE Asia.
Another UNICEF statistic illustrates this well by reporting that “In 2001, a total of 2.7
million crossings were recorded, and the cross-border trade [with Vietnam] came to 850
million yuan (about US$102 million)” along one 33 kilometer stretch of border in
Guangxi.53 Though Guangxi province is not in ASEAN, the statistic is included to help
the reader grasp the volume of people movements in the region.

52. UNICEF, “China, Vietnam join hands to fight cross-border trafficking of women,” under
“Real Lives,” http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/china_2530.html (accessed February 10, 2008).
53. Ibid., UNICEF
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Immigration policies in destination countries also complicate matters by allowing
trafficked persons, in particular women, an overt way into the country where they are
then exploited. Japan’s entertainment visas are an example of this, 54 and are “widely
known to be a legal channel that is abused for trafficking women for sexual
exploitation.”55 The majority of recipients of said visas are Filipina women who wind up
in the sex-industry in Japan.56
As in other parts of the world, a combination of poverty, wealth disparities, social
mores, and porous borders creates the basic conditions that generate trafficking. An
October 2004 memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed by the component countries
of the Greater Mekong Sub-Region makes this explicit. The MOU recognizes “that
poverty, lack of access to education, and inequalities, including lack of equal opportunity
make persons vulnerable to trafficking.” 57 Social causes are further recognized,
“acknowledging that trafficking is further intensified by discriminatory practices,
attitudes, practices and policies based on gender, age, nationality, ethnicity and social
grouping”.58
The linkage between poverty and social marginalization is increasingly
recognized as an important contributing factor to human trafficking. Specifically of note
54. Japan is a major destination country for trafficked women from SE Asia, in particular Thailand
and the Philippines
55. June Lee, “Human Trafficking in East Asia: Current Trends, Data Collection, and Knowledge
Gaps,” International Migration 43, no. 1-2 (2005): 9
56. Ibid., 10
57. GMS Countries, “Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation Against Trafficking in
Persons in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region,” Yangon, October 29, 2004.
58. Ibid., MOU
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is the recognition of the role that ethnicity and social class play in making trafficked
people, particularly women, vulnerable. Women from rural areas and women who are
members of ethnic minorities, or hill tribes,59 are thought to be more vulnerable to
trafficking (as well as HIV and non-traditional drug use) due to the remoteness of their
environment and their lack of access to information on the matter.60
Poverty is clearly a factor in the supply side of human trafficking, but absolute
poverty is not the key variable. Rather, it is the great disparity in wealth between the
origin countries and destination countries that is the prime causal factor on the demand
and supply sides. It is no coincidence that the wealthiest countries in East Asia are also
the ones with the most developed demand for trafficked women: Hong Kong, South
Korea, and Japan. China’s rapid economic growth has also generated an increase in
human trafficking for both labor and sexual exploitation.61
Consistent with the commonly held image of the region, sex trafficking is the
predominant form of trafficking in the region. UNODC’s 2009 Global Report on
Trafficking in Persons summarizes this situation. First, “victims were predominately
trafficked for the purpose of sexual exploitation throughout the region.”62
Correspondingly, “based on profiles of victims identified by State authorities, or who
were assisted by other institutions, women and girls were the primary victims of

59. Major “hill tribe,” or minority, populations exist in northern Thailand, northern and eastern
Burma, parts of Laos, and the interior of Vietnam.
60. UNESCO Bangkok, “Mission,” under “Trafficking and HIV/AIDS Project,”
http://www.unescobkk.org/index.php?id=672 (accessed February 3, 2008).
61. “More Forced Into Labor, Prostitution,” China Daily, July 27, 2007, English edition.
62. UNODC, 2009, 54
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trafficking in the region.”63 Finally, in its 2009 report the UNODC assessed trafficking
flows in East Asia to be particularly complex and also for the distribution of East Asian
trafficking victims to be very widespread.64
Although much of Asia’s human trafficking is intraregional, the 2006 UNODC
report confirms that intercontinental trafficking does still exist as a substantial problem,
specifically saying that “most remarkably, victims from East Asia were detected in more
than twenty countries in regions throughout the world.” This suggests that— in the
Report’s words—“trafficking of East Asians is a bit of a phenomenon in itself and worthy
of further detailed study.”65
Citing aggregated data collected from countries which responded to the
UNODC’s research questionnaire, the Report states that East Asian countries are affected
by complex trafficking flows,” and that many East Asian countries were countries of
origin for trafficking in persons within and outside the region.” The Mekong region
countries “were destinations for cross border trafficking within the Mekong sub-region,
and at the same time origin countries for trans-regional trafficking.”66 The key variable
that applies some order to this complicated set of trafficking patterns is that wealth
disparities—whether between neighbors or continents—determine the direction of
movement.

63. UNODC, 2009, 55
64. UNODC, 2009, 61
65. UNODC, 2006, 11
66. Ibid., 66
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The Political Economy of SE Asian Human Trafficking
Social and gender issues aside, this paper, as stated previously, treats human
trafficking as a political science question by examining it from a policy standpoint. Key
to understanding the growth of human trafficking and the challenges facing policy
makers and practitioners in fighting it is the way that political, economic, and
demographic macro-trends have contributed to the phenomenon. It is a convergence of
economics, demographics, and policy (labor policy, border policy, international policy
harmonization, etc.) that really create the conditions that allow human trafficking to
occur.
A 2008 study from the International Organization for Migration contains excellent
recent research into the political economy of human trafficking. The report states:
One of the more remarkable dimensions of the economic and social transformations
that have engulfed East and South-East Asia during the past three decades has been
the growth of cross-border movements of workers. The unbalanced growth of the
economies of the region widened the gaps in relative incomes and standards of
living, which in turn magnified the ‘pull’ and ‘push’ factors that shape migration
movements [emphasis added].67

Conventional wisdom holds that young, underemployed persons faced with the lure
of economic opportunity abroad are prime candidates for being trafficked. This basic
assumption is also confirmed by the IOM, “The ‘usual suspects’ driving migration –
productivity and income differences, rapidly growing cohorts of young workers in
populations, ageing populations in others, declining costs of transport and

67. International Organization for Migration, Regional Thematic Working Group on International
Migration Including Human Trafficking, “Situation Report on International Migration in East and SouthEast Asia,” Bangkok, 2008, 139.
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communication– are present in East and South-East Asia and have undoubtedly
contributed to the recent trends.”68 Labor migration, the vehicle upon which much human
trafficking occurs, is very much a function of demographics and economics. Labor
migration may be an immutable condition of market economics, but the conditions under
which these migrants move about are very much a function of how policy makers in the
source, transit, and destination countries view the situation and adjust to it.
Policy makers attempting to address labor migration, and the irregular migration
that accompanies it, are faced with a very difficult set of options. As the IOM report
points out, “migration flows tend to respond quickly to labour market demand and supply
rather than to government policies, which take time to formulate and implement. The
policies are often not comprehensive or coherent, and may only partially meet the needs
and/or development objectives of the country in question.”69 Coupled with this is the
often counter-productive nature of restrictive migration policies which themselves are
thought to lead to irregular migration as would-be migrants seek gray or black market
alternatives because of government-led efforts to restrict their economic options. The
analogy would be of putting a band-aid on a severed artery: “Experience suggests that
tight border controls have a limited impact unless other factors driving migration are
addressed simultaneously.”70
Two policy considerations come directly from this. First, the “other factors”

68. Ibid., 140
69. Ibid., 127
70. Ibid., 127
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driving the movements are not singular, but actually a relationship between two or more
countries (that is, the surplus and shortage of cheap labor in the respective states).
Second, the convergence of economics, demographics, and politics requires a holistic
approach. Addressing migration by decree alone does not stem the movement, it shunts it
into illegal channels wherein people are more vulnerable to being trafficked and
enslaved. Migration, and its associated phenomenon of trafficking both require a policy
response that is international and holistic. “International migration is an area in which
governments can greatly benefit from international cooperation in formulating
comprehensive and effective migration management policies that achieve desired results.
However, the achievement of such results remains hampered, in many cases, by the lack
of policy coherence at the national level.”71
The IOM’s 2008 research very clearly supports the conclusions that this paper
draws concerning the three wealth-related variables discussed in chapter one. Poverty at
the source—absolute poverty— begins a chain of migration. The direction of this
migration is determined largely, if not entirely by relative wealth disparities. These
disparities exist not just between neighboring states or sub-regions as is the case in SE
Asia, but also between regions and continents. In this simplified summary of the
economic roots of migration chains, all three of the wealth variables mentioned in chapter
one are clearly present. All three contribute to the presence of the dependent variable—
the incidence of trafficking in the given region—in SE Asia. None of these variables are
limited by borders or state authority, yet they contribute to an acute non-traditional

71. Ibid., 134
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security threat that states must none the less find a way to address.

Onto Policy
The ASEAN response to trafficking is summarized in a 2006 report titled
“ASEAN Responses to Human Trafficking”.72 The report lists eleven broad strategies
that the Member Countries have developed to overcome the trafficking related challenges
that they face. These strategies broadly conform to the so-called “3 Ps”: prevention,
prosecution, and protection. Some strategies are general, applicable to anti-trafficking
efforts anywhere in the world. For instance, developing accurate information on
trafficking, developing national action plans, and establishing legal frameworks to
prosecute traffickers. Some strategies are specifically listed because they address
deficiencies in existing Member Country approaches, for instance efforts focusing on
protection of victims and witness support. A strategy such as “establishing safer
migration routes and work practices” is aimed at remedying one of the biggest
vulnerability factors that leads to trafficking in SE Asia, as detailed in the background
section above. These strategies are the product of a process of policy development that is
over a decade old. They represent the intergovernmental and functionalist nature of
ASEAN’s still evolving response to human trafficking within its region.
ASEAN is comprised of ten states, all of varying political, economic, and sociocultural character. For this reason, ASEAN depends on the consensus-based decision
making discussed earlier. It should not be surprising to us that decision making and

72. ASEAN, ASEAN Responses to Human Trafficking, (Jakarta, 2006).
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policy development within ASEAN are not streamlined or rapid processes. Policy
making in ASEAN is characterized by ministerial meetings, formal and informal
summits, communiqués, and declarations.
At its most basic, ASEAN’s anti-trafficking response is represented by three core
documents: ASEAN Vision 2020, produced in 1997; the ASEAN Declaration on
Transnational Crime, also produced in 1997; and the ASEAN Declaration against
Trafficking in Persons, Particularly Women and Children, produced in 2004. In addition
to these three key documents the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance should also be
considered. Other document types, the various communiqués and declarations, while not
key documents in the sense of expressing firm obligations, are still worthy of
consideration because they are supplemental information sources that allow us to map the
course of ASEAN’s anti-trafficking policy.

Policy History: A Question of Cooperation
Human trafficking got its first significant mention in official ASEAN documents
in the late 1990s. The ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime, signed on December
20, 1997, in Manila states that the Parties are “concerned about the pernicious effects of
transnational crime, such as terrorism, illicit drug trafficking, arms smuggling, money
laundering, traffic in persons and piracy.”73 At this early point, trafficking was bundled
in the broader category of transnational crime. Human trafficking would remain
connected with other transnational crime for years to come, before eventually evolving
into a stand-alone issue of concern.
73. ASEAN, The ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime (Manila, 20 December 1997).
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Media reports and press conference statements from SE Asian leaders throughout
the mid and late 1990s demonstrate that awareness of transnational security challenges,
including crime, was steadily developing, and that as this awareness of transnational
crime grew, so too did talk about a regional response to it. By the mid-1990s, bilateral
operations were already being conducted to counter transnational crime. Additionally,
presaging the language of the ASEAN 2020 document, this crime was already explicitly
viewed as an obstacle to the stability and prosperity that the ASEAN states sought.74
Speaking at the ASEAN Conference on Transnational Crime in 1997, then President of
the Philippines, Fidel Ramos, “stated that transnational crimes and terrorism have
‘assaulted’ regional security and continue to threaten Southeast Asia's economic gains
and stability.” Ramos continued to say that efforts by SE Asian states to confront
transnational crime had not been “consolidated” and that action at the “political level”
was required to create the necessary “common front” against transnational criminal
elements.75 The Declaration Against Transnational Crime was the result of this meeting.
Three months later at the first annual ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on
Transnational Crime, Ramos expanded on his message of transnational crime’s politicaleconomic consequences and its correspondingly necessary political solution. In his
speech opening the conference, Ramos said that “We cannot allow [transnational crime’s]

74. “Philippine and Malaysian police forge joint security agreement,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur,
June 4,1996. A statement from Philippine National Police Director Recaredo Sarmiento in 1996 provides
an indication that at the practitioner level this was understood: “We believe that regional prosperity in
ASEAN is difficult - if not impossible - without regional freedom from organised fraud, terrorism and
crime.“
75. “Manila calls for common ASEAN effort against transnational crime,” Deutsche PresseAgentur, 20 December 1997.
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growing influence to distract us from the more productive pursuit of economic
development and social progress; not while economies in the region already stagger
under pressure of the financial storm buffeting East Asia,” adding that the phenomenon
was too large for SE Asia’s small states to tackle independently.76 Ramos specifically
recommended increased intelligence exchange between countries, a concept that would
be formally adopted in later ASEAN anti-trafficking policy. This cooperative, regionalist
sentiment was echoed by Philippine Defense Minister Orlando Mercado at the 1999
meeting of the ASEAN Defense Technology Exchange, when he said, “Given the reality
that all our nations face the same problems and risks, it makes reasonable strategic sense
for us to try, as much as possible, to exhaust all avenues for cooperation in order to
address them more effectively. We all need each other to survive.”77
The principles expressed by the Filipino leaders about growing regional
interdependence were still solidifying into regional consensus by June 1999 when the
ASEAN states convened the second AMMTC in Yangon. Singapore Home Affairs
Minister Wong Kan Seng addressed the conference, saying that crime across borders had
become more sophisticated, and that greater consultation and cooperation among ASEAN
member countries was needed to defeat the problem. Wong said that “sustained and
concerted effort at bilateral and regional levels” was required. Of note was the continued
linkage between defeating transnational crime and pursuing greater regional prosperity
when Wong said that the second AMMTC “brings us a step closer to a safer region for

76. Fel Margay, “Ramos seeks stronger global efforts vs transnational crime,” Manila Standard, 24
March, 1998.
77. “Anti-crime,” Business World, May 12, 1999.
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our people to live in, better conditions for growth and boosting investors' confidence in
the region.”78
The dominant political mood surrounding the 32nd AMM in July 1999, the first
ministerial meeting to follow the 1998 Asian economic crisis, seemed to broadly agree
that reconsolidation and deepened cooperation, even integration, were the only ways
forward. Remarks from various foreign ministers at the conference reinforce this sense.
Thai Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan stated that for “ASEAN to be viable as an
Organisation, we must coordinate more closely our policies, especially on important
political, economic and social issues of concern.”79 The meeting’s joint communiqué
spoke of “consolidation and rebuilding which would undoubtedly reinforce our
foundations,” and said that the ministers had “unanimously reaffirmed the relevance and
value of ASEAN to all our countries and renewed our determination to strengthen
ASEAN.”80
Amidst this talk of a revitalized ASEAN following the economic crisis was the
question of whether or not ASEAN needed to formalize certain of its activities. In the
Secretary-General’s report following the 32nd AMM, Severino suggested that “ASEAN
should explore the possibility of undertaking more legally binding agreements to promote
cooperation in various fields, such as economic dispute settlement, the environment, and

78. “Greater ASEAN ties needed to fight crime,” The Straits Times (Singapore), 24 June, 1999.
79. Dr. Surin Pitsuwan, “Statement by His Excellency Dr. Surin Pitsuwan Minister of Foreign
Affairs of the Kingdom of Thailand” (speech, 32nd ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Singapore, July 23,
1999).
80. ASEAN, “Joint Communique, 32nd ASEAN Ministerial Meeting,” Singapore, July 22-24,
1999.
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transnational crime.”81 Finally, Severino added that there “is no alternative to regional
cooperation and integration. Globalization compels ASEAN member countries to
establish common positions on global issues and to take advantage of its collective
weight.”82
The bruising that the SE Asian countries took in the financial crisis of 1998 seems
to have jolted many of their leaders into a greater awareness of the challenges that
globalization presented. The “Asian contagion” was a hard lesson in the new interconnectedness that now dominated international relations. A reading of the statements
and documents associated with the 1999 AMM leave no doubt that economic recovery
and the question of further economic integration were the most important topics.
However, we should bear in mind the linkage that has previously been demonstrated
between ASEAN’s long-term economic goals and the various “transboundary issues,”
including transnational crime and human trafficking.
Concern for transnational crime seems to have grown jointly out of concern for
terrorism, initially, and the social and cultural effects of various transnational problems,
not just criminal ones. ASEAN tackled the issue of transnational terrorism specifically,
at a meeting in Baguio City, Philippines and adopted the subsequent Baguio
Communiqué in February 1996, “which endeavored to enhance international cooperation

81. Rudolfo Severino, “Report of the Secretary General” (report, 32nd ASEAN Ministerial
Meeting, Singapore, July 22-24, 1999).
82. Ibid.
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against all forms of terrorism through such modalities as intelligence sharing, coordinated
policies and law enforcement training.”83
Another source of the transnational crime policy emerging at the Manila meeting
can be identified as the “decision of the 29th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Jakarta in
July 1996 on the need to focus attention on such issues as narcotics, economic crimes
including money laundering, environment and illegal migration which transcend borders
and affect the lives of people in the region.”84 Transnational crime—this time coupled
explicitly with functional cooperation—was mentioned in the 30th AMM Joint
Communiqué in 1997, which stated “The Foreign Ministers expressed satisfaction with
the progress made in implementing the Framework for Elevating Functional Cooperation
to a Higher Plane85 with the development of a number of flagship projects in science and
technology, environment, culture and information, social development, and drugs and
narcotics control.”86
Transnational crime also featured somewhat at the ASEAN Heads of State
Informal Summit, also in 1997.87 Addressing transnational issues, whether economic,

83. Manila Declaration, 1997
84. ASEAN, Joint Communiqué of The 29th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, (Jakarta, July 1996),
para. 44. Paragraph 44 goes on to state: “[Foreign Ministers] shared the view that the management of such
transnational Issues is urgently called for so that they would not affect the long-term viability ASEAN and
its individual member nations.
85. ASEAN, Joint Communiqué, 1996, para, 36. Paragraph 36 states: “pursuant to the decision of
the Fifth ASEAN Summit to elevate functional cooperation to a higher plane.”
86. ASEAN, Joint Communiqué of the 30th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, (Subang Jaya,
Malaysia, July 24-25 1997). Paragraph 45 states: ”encourage the development of an integrated approach of
the functional and economic cooperation mechanism within ASEAN.”
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ecological, or criminal, was gaining policy momentum by the late 1990s. Looking in the
context of this ministerial-level discussion about transnational crime, the adoption of the
Manila Declaration “reflected ASEAN's resolve in dealing with transnational crime and
its intention to work together with the international community in combating
transnational crime,”88 and was a logical way for ASEAN to have “established the basic
framework for regional cooperation in fighting transnational crime.”89
Several reasons can be deduced for this developing interest in fighting
transnational crime. First, and most obviously, the specific issues that fall under
ASEAN’s category of “transnational” are serious and legitimate areas of policy concern.
It is not necessary to over-rationalize a decision to address pollution, terrorism, or crime.
Second, these issues do exceed the means of any one ASEAN member state to effectively
combat on its. Third, the groundwork for Vision 2020 was already being laid at this
point, and ASEAN state leaders were likely feeling pressure to address issues that could
adversely “affect the long term viability of ASEAN and its individual member nations.”90
The ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime mandated the “once every two
years ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime in order to coordinate

87. ASEAN, Press Statement of the 2nd ASEAN Informal Meeting of Heads of
State/Government, (Kuala Lumpur, December 15, 1997). Transnational crime is mentioned, but not
prominently, as the statement was mostly occupied with Mekong Basin development initiatives; the actual
mention was: ”The HSOG resolved to take firm and stern measures to combat trans- national crimes such
as drug trafficking, trafficking in women and children as well as other trans-national crimes.”
88. ASEAN, Asian Regional Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime, Manila Declaration on
the Prevention and Control of Transnational Crime, (Manila, March 23-25,1998)
89. ASEAN Plan of Action, 1997
90. ASEAN, Manila Declaration, 1998
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activities of relevant ASEAN bodies.”91 The first of these AMMTC meetings was held
the following year; in line with the intent of the March 1998 Manila meeting, “for the
purpose of promoting regional and international cooperation to combat transnational
crime.”92 This declaration is significant to my analysis for two reasons. First, we can see
in the language of the 1998 Manila Declaration that ASEAN’s leadership is beginning to
view transnational crime as a broad security issue, as much as a social one. The States
“recognize that organized crime undermines civil society, distorts legitimate markets and
destabilizes states.”93 The language equating transnational crime to a national security
and a political-economic threat will be reinforced in later policy statements. Second, in
the 1998 Manila Declaration a distinctly functionalist tone begins to emerge in relation to
the proposed steps. This can be seen in a few places in particular in the Declaration.
Some kind of cooperative, if not integrative, effort is implied by language like: “regional
action”; “international cooperation”; “harmonizing, as appropriate, existing laws”;
“responding to the complexity and sophistication of various forms of transnational crime,
so as to bridge the gaps in legal systems”; and “developing new regional programs”.94
The functionalist nature of the emerging anti-transnational crime effort is more
explicit in other passages. Article 8 of the Declaration states that, “combating the above
mentioned [transnational] forms of crime requires concerted action at all levels. As these
crimes transcend national boundaries, international cooperation is essential,

91. ASEAN, Declaration, 1997
92. ASEAN, Manila Declaration, 1998, para 2
93. ASEAN, Manila Declaration, 1998, para 1
94. Ibid., Manilla Declaration
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complemented by collaborative ties at the regional and sub-regional levels.”95 Two tasks
follow from this statement. First, the ASEAN States must create infrastructure that will
allow regional cooperation. Second, they must increase information exchange on matters
relating to organized crime and benefit from best practices used in neighboring states.
The fight against transnational crime is explicitly linked, as a subordinate or
supporting area of action to Vision 2020, in the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat
Transnational Crime. Vision 2020 was adopted at the 1997 Second Informal Summit.
Vision 2020 “envisioned the evolution of agreed rules of behavior and cooperative
measures to deal with problems that can be met only on a regional scale, including drug
trafficking, trafficking in women and children and other transnational crimes.”96 In as
much as Vision 2020 became the center of ASEAN policy considerations, then
transnational crime, and by extension trafficking, became elevated to first order
considerations on the understanding that this set of problems would undermine the
conditions necessary for the economic and political integration called for by Vision 2020.
ASEAN’s leadership was increasingly aware of the long-term economic gain that
integration would offer, but they understood that this economic integration would not
exist in a vacuum. Then ASEAN Secretary General, Rodolfo Severino expressed the
thinking underlying ASEAN’s policy making at the time, during an interview at the 1999
Ministerial Meeting. Severino said, “You cannot separate politics from economics. If
you are integrated economically, then you have to engage with one another more closely

95. ASEAN, Manila Declaration,1998, para 8
96. ASEAN, “ASEAN Vision 2020,” (Kuala Lumpur, December 15, 1997).
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in political terms.” In the same interview, Severino went on to say: “everything is open
for discussion at the July meeting, including controversial issues such as…transnational
crimes, [and] human rights….”97
A few specific features of the Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime
warrant a closer look. Six sets of activity are named under section C, Programme of
Action/Priorities.98 Among these activities are: information exchange, involving shared
database development and networking; legal matters, involving harmonization of national
policies and bi and multilateral cooperation; law enforcement matters, involving
professional exchange programs for police and prosecutors; training, involving best
practices exchanges; institutional capacity building, notably the establishment of the
ASEAN Center for Combating Transnational Crime; and extra regional cooperation with
states and international organizations.

Misalignment and Harmonization
Harmonization is a central topic in ASEAN policy circles. The question of
harmonization is especially critical in regard to legal matters because of the aid that legal
misalignment between neighbors provides for criminal elements. Harmonization
emerged more frequently as a topic beginning in 1999. At a speech organized by the
Singapore Institute of International Affairs, Rudolfo Severino said, “I am gratified to

97. Cathy Rose Garcia, “Crisis-hit ASEAN eyes deeper regional integration,” Business World,
June 25, 1999.
98. ASEAN, The ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime, Section C Programme
of Action, (1998).
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have a part in your examination of the concepts of sovereignty and intervention. The
tension between these two concepts is emerging as an important issue of our time.”99
Then Chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee, Dr Surin Pitsuwan discussed
the underlying rationale for harmonization at the conclusion of the 6th ASC meeting in
July 2000. Discussing ASEAN’s traditional transboundary issues of haze, cyber crime,
terrorism, drugs, and human trafficking, Pitsuwan said “All these problems, because of
the nature in which they are being transformed, cannot be regarded as domestic or
exclusively internal like before."100 The point of Pitsuwan’s remarks came when he raised
the issue of non-interference as it relates to harmonization, saying “[ASEAN’s cardinal
principle] is going to remain [non-interference], but some issues will have to be redefined
whether they are exclusively internal or they have the potential of spilling over to
neighbouring countries.”101 ASEAN faces a constant tension between an instinct toward
regionalism, cooperation, and even integration on one hand, and between the sacrosanct
ASEAN principles of non-interference and absolute respect for sovereignty on the other.
Different ASEAN states have variously pushed for improved harmonization of
anti-trafficking laws. During the 2002 Senior Officials Meeting Malaysian Deputy Home
Affairs Minister Chor Chee Heung said, “What may be a crime in one country may have
yet to be criminalised in another. This causes prosecution to be difficult,” adding, “When
a criminal act takes place in different jurisdictions, successful prosecution relies upon

99. Rudolfo Severino, “Sovereignty, Intervention, and the ASEAN Way,” (speech, Singapore
Institute of International Affairs, Singapore, July 3, 2000).
100. Kararuzalman Salleh ,“Issues affecting Asean no longer internal,” New Straits Times
(Malaysia) July 23, 2000.
101. New Straits Times, 2000
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effective regional and international cooperation.”102
Thai newspaper The Nation reports from 2004 that, “Thailand yesterday proposed
models for harmonizing legal differences and intelligence sharing among members of
[ASEAN] with the aim of enhancing regional cooperation to combat transnational crimes,
including terrorism.” Then ASEAN Deputy Secretary General Wilfrido Villacorta was
quoted as saying “’at this moment, such harmonization has not been achieved and we
have a long way to go.’” 103 The article continued to say, “some ASEAN countries still
lacked necessary laws to combat transnational crime.”104 Villacorta added, “’There is no
legal framework at this stage that covers legal assistance or extradition in all ASEAN
countries. It is, therefore, necessary to explore the possibility of developing such a
structure.’”105 The above quotation illustrates an important problem that ASEAN faces in
developing cooperative policy schemes. There is a large gap between the political and
legal maturity of its members. Another article wrote a few days earlier, “there were
currently legal differences among the way Asean members combat transnational crime.
For example, some nations have extradition and anti-terrorism laws while others do
not.”106

102. Reme Ahmad, “Asean officials meeting in KL consider uniform laws to fight crimes such as
drug trafficking, arms smuggling and sea piracy,” The Straits Times (Singapore), May 17, 2002.
103. Rungrawee C. Pinyorat, “Asean in bid to close legal havens,” The Nation (Bangkok), January
8, 2004.
104. Ibid.
105. Ibid.
106. Piyanart Srivalo, “Bangkok hosting regional crime talks,” The Nation, January 5, 2004.
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The AMMTC process of recurrent pledges and meetings, marked by non-binding
communiqués and agreements, all seems to highlight the much-derided ASEAN
ineffectiveness. There is truth in this; but it is a necessary weakness of ASEAN due to its
consensus-based modus operandi. However, it would be an error to dismiss ASEAN’s
efforts against transnational crime. Emphasis on the “promotion and strengthening of
linkages,” “sub-regional and regional treaties on cooperation in judicial matters”, “
information exchange” and bolstered research and analysis capabilities, as well as
numerous conferences, meetings, and professional workshops is well aligned to the
problems that have been identified as present in ASEAN’s anti-crime, and specifically
anti-trafficking responses.107
In November 2004, the ASEAN heads of state met in Vientiane and adopted the
“ASEAN Declaration Against Trafficking in Persons Particularly Women and Children.”
This is not a revolutionary document that charted a brave new course in ASEAN antitrafficking policy, rather it is a reaffirmation of, and a head of state level document that
summarizes, the multiple ministerial level declarations and agreements that had preceded
it for the previous seven years since the adoption of the ASEAN Declaration, the Manila
Declaration and the Plan of Action.
A couple of key pieces of language from the 2004 Declaration need to be
addressed. First, is the acknowledgment “that social, economic, and other factors that
cause people to migrate also make them vulnerable to trafficking in persons.”108 This is

107. Joint Communiqués of the Second, Third, and Fourth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on
Transnational Crime
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important because it addresses the economic disparities that prompt high-risk migration.
Most significant though, is the clause stating that the member states will take action
against trafficking “to the extent permitted by their respective domestic laws and
policies,” in a “concerted” manner. This is an explicit affirmation of the
intergovernmental, state-to-state, basis for ASEAN’s anti-trafficking cooperation.
What should be clear from this policy history is the intergovernmental nature of
ASEAN’s anti-trafficking efforts. Transnational institutions are conspicuously absent.
Rather, ASEAN’s efforts are focused on synchronizing respective national level
institutions and increasing their communication with each other. Making national level
institutions the focal point, prioritizing the individual state’s responsibility and capacity
to respond while simultaneously depending on interstate cooperation, is far more in
keeping with ASEAN’s underlying values of unconditional respect for member
sovereignty.
The discussion of harmonization also involves our fourth variable, the question of
government type. Government matters in this respect because it is individual national
governments that must pass laws and adopt policies that are synchronized with their
neighbors. Government type does not seem to be a critical factor here, as the lack of
harmonization and the lack of sufficient legal statutes to adequately criminalize
trafficking was a problem across the region. Just as the type of government that a state is
endowed with does not clearly impact the dependent variable—extent of trafficking—it

108. ASEAN, Declaration Against Trafficking in Persons Particularly Women and Children,
(Vientiane: November 2004), 78.
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also appears that government type doesn’t influence the nature of the state’s response in a
discernable way.
Misalignment should also not be thought of as just existing between the laws and
policies of the states. In addition to this intergovernmental misalignment, there is also a
lack of symmetry between the transnational nature of human trafficking and the
intergovernmental approach that ASEAN is currently limited to in its efforts to address it.

ASEAN’s Anti-Trafficking Efforts: Hitting the Wall?
ASEAN’s anti-trafficking efforts display many characterisitcs of Mitranian
functional cooperation. Having said this, a high degree of integration is not present in
ASEAN’s anti-transnational crime and trafficking policies. Rather, as mentoned above,
ASEAN’s policies are based in augmenting the capacities of individual governemnts to
act against traffficking in concert wiith others. ASEAN’s anti-trafficking regime is not
one that is functionalist and integrated but functionalist and intergovernmental. Also as
mentioned above, this is not surprising, given the confederated nature of ASEAN’s
organization and the deeply enshrined respect for individual national sovereignty.
The next question that should be examined, that this paper cannot conclusively
address, is whether the functionalist intergovernmental approach is sufficient, or if
ASEAN must procede with more formal integration in order to really address trafficking.
Currently ASEAN relfects an integrative instinct, but institutions and regimes which
subsume some corner of national sovereignty to tackle a problem are conspicuously
absent. The tension between a desire for the fruits of regional integration and policy
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coherence and a deep attachment to non-interference is an underlying fact of political life
in ASEAN.
“Asean has set regional norms for the peaceful relations among states—respect for
sovereignty and territorial integrity, the peaceful settlement of disputes, non-interference
in the internal affairs of nations, decisions by consensus, equality of status, and so on.”109
Severino’s statement from 2006 raises a nagging point about ASEAN’s essential
character. Is this a diplomatic alliance that is designed to open multi-lateral diplomatic
channels to ensure peace and security, or is it a regional organization with the ability to
tackle transnational policy concerns? ASEAN has arguably been very successful at the
former, but performed questionably at the latter. Again, citing Severino, “The record of
cooperation in dealing with transnational problems has been spotty. The effectiveness of
the cooperative mechanisms in place has been uneven. Regional cooperation has been
held back by competing national interests, in some instances by mutual suspicion, and by
an apparent lack of faith in the efficacy of regional action.”110 ASEAN’s members trust
each other enough not to go to war against each other, but not to merge sovereignty to
address transnational threats.
Goodwill and open communication abound at the ministerial meetings, but
identifiable practices stemming from these meetings and their agreements are
conspicuously hard to find. SE Asia’s complex trafficking flows involve overlapping
combinations of multiple borders and victim nationalities, yet the preponderance of antitrafficking initiatives are domestic/national or bilateral. This represents a misalignment
109. Severino, 2006
110. Severino, 2006
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between policy and problem. Naturally, we must consider if this is a symptom of
institutional limitations within ASEAN and the intergovernmentalism that prevails
between its members.
“The decision to adopt the 'Asean Way', which prioritises agreement by consensus
and the adoption of the lowest common denominator, means that its claim to become an
increasingly rules- based organisation will remain just that.”111 What impact will
ASEAN’s continued reliance on consensus instead of rules have on its ability to deal with
human trafficking, and the other non-traditional security threats that it has identified?
What specific areas of anti-trafficking policy will be off-limits to ASEAN states without
a rules-based security pillar under which to bundle anti-trafficking policies?
Barry Desker, dean of the Rajaratnam School of International Studies at
Singapore’s Nanyang University, stated in a 2008 article, that following the
underwhelming 2007 Charter ASEAN remains a diplomatic community, good at
preventing war and building confidence among members. Desker raises the question of
how ASEAN can tackle transnational threats that themselves are increasingly integrated
across borders, through levels of society, and over multiple policy disciplines, without
itself being more integrated. Does a threshold exist beyond which intergovernmental
coordination cannot generate a sufficiently concerted response to disrupt a tightly and
complexly integrated threat?
Thus far, some progress has been made within the intergovernmental functional
approach of ASEAN, and its component states. This progress, as indicated previously, is
111. Barry Desker, “Where the Asean charter comes up short,” Straits Times (Singapore), July 18,
2008.
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less concrete at the level of the ASEAN itself, and more concrete at the bilateral and subregional level. The lack of really robust and hard policy from ASEAN itself is a potential
indicator of the limitations of the intergovernmental approach. Intergovernmentalism
may have succeeded in raising anti-trafficking policy from non-existent to an established
area of concern, but integrated policy at a supranational level may be necessary. The
need for integrated supranational policy responses to transnational threats is also
indicated by the case study of the EU’s anti-trafficking policies.
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Chapter Four: The European Union’s Response

Introduction
Approximately 90% of European states (in and out of the EU) have antitrafficking legislation that criminalizes human trafficking as a specific offense. The
specific criminalization of trafficking has become more and more uniform across Europe
(and the rest of the world) following the 2003 adoption of the UN Protocol to Prevent,
Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons. The only European countries that currently
lack offense-specific legislation are Poland and Estonia.
The 2009 US State Department Trafficking in Persons Report lists 17 EU
countries in its Tier 1 category for states that fully comply with the US’s TVPA standards
(themselves very similar to the standards contained in the UN’s Protocol). The remaining
seven EU countries— mostly newer members in Central and Eastern Europe—fall under
Tier 2, meaning that they are judged not to fully comply with anti-trafficking standards,
but are making significant effort to do so. Latvia is the only EU country on the Tier 2
Watch List for countries that do not comply and are not making efforts to do so. Latvia
shares this category with known trafficking centers such as Cambodia, Philippines, the
UAE, and Qatar among others. No EU member states are listed on Tier 3.
The State Department’s figures for prosecutions and convictions tell an equally
mixed story. Figures for Europe (including non-EU states in Eastern Europe) show an
increase of prosecutions from 2231 to 2808 between 2003 and 2008. Convictions from
these prosecutions increased approximately 15% from 1469 to 1721 over the same five70

year period.112 This seemingly small increase in prosecutions across Europe coincided
with a decrease in overall crime within the EU itself, from approximately 17.5 million
total crimes in 2003 to approximately 16.3 in 2007, however violent crime increased
moderately from approximately 930,000 incidents to 978,000 between 2003 to 2007.113
Specific data on human trafficking are not available through Eurostat. The lack of
meaningful statistics on human trafficking within the EU, comprised largely of relatively
wealthy and democratic states provides a sharp reminder that this phenomenon is difficult
to track even for governments with relatively robust resources. The European
Commission admits this knowledge gap; saying that reliable figures for total volume of
trafficking in Europe is “probably around several hundred thousand, mostly for
prostitution.” Adding that in 2006, the last year that it has statistics on trafficking
prosecutions, “prosecutors brought just 1 500 criminal trafficking cases to court in the
whole of the EU.”114

Human Trafficking Policy in Europe: A Post-Soviet Context
Beginning in the 1990s three factors began to converge in greater Europe that drove
the human trafficking phenomenon into public awareness, two of which are directly
linked to the collapse of the Soviet Union. These are the loss of economic security and a
simultaneous breakdown in public order. External to these two post-Soviet factors was
112. Department of State, 2009, 53
113. European Commission, “Crimes Recorded by Police,” under “Documents,”
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/crime/documents/total_crime.pdf, (accessed April 11,
2010).
114. European Commission, “Protecting the Weakest,”
http://ec.europa.eu/news/justice/100329_en.htm, (accessed April 11, 2010).
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the general phenomenon of a shrinking world. Advances in telecommunications and the
internet, coupled with the easing of travel and visa restrictions within Europe created a
perfect storm of highly vulnerable economic migrants from the Eastern Bloc states, an
economic and politico-legal system which could no longer account for their welfare and a
world of unprecedented interconnection between people (and criminals) and permeable
borders.
As the world began to get accustomed to this new world order (anarchic as it was,
compared to the relative rigidity of the Cold War era) a new set of opportunities and
perils presented themselves. The opportunities are well accounted for in the existing
narratives—both supportive and critical— about neoliberalism, and do not need to be
recounted here. Along with new business opportunities and new wealth, came problems
that were either completely new by type, or new in their increased severity. The traffic in
drugs, guns, and people, the laundering of criminal proceeds across the world, a growing
interconnectedness between organized crime groups, and a more diffuse and
sophisticated kind of transnational terrorism were a new reality that even the world’s
most powerful states found themselves frequently ignorant of and ill-equipped to combat.
The political situation of the early post-Soviet years was captured well in a
statement from then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali at a UN conference on
organized crime in late 1994. Ghali said: “The collapse of communism and the
disintegration of the Soviet Union have led to a weakening of institutional structures and
a loss of social and ideological benchmarks in Eastern Europe,'' he added that
international criminal groups had expanded ''traditional spheres of activity such as
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prostitution, the arms trade and trafficking in drugs'' to ''money-laundering, the trade in
nuclear technology and human organs, and the transporting of illegal immigrants''.115
Ghali’s reference to “transporting illegal immigrants” is telling. At the time, and in many
cases up until the international standardization of the crime by the Palermo Protocol,
human trafficking was often undistinguished from the more innocuous-sounding offenses
of “smuggling” or “transporting.” The slavery aspect of the crime was not fully
appreciated.
Capturing the newness of human trafficking, or of uncontrolled irregular migration
generally, a CSIS paper also from November 1994 mentions instances of law
enforcement authorities in Austria, Spain, and Sweden being “alarmed” after discovering
that their border had been compromised by smuggling networks spanning across Eurasia,
but invariably running through Russia among other transit points.116 The paper cites
chronic official corruption and revolutionized means of communications and
transportation before writing that “no factor is perhaps more critical to this trade than the
global surge in emigration,” and that population increase, lack of employment, and
poverty in the developing world were prompting millions of people worldwide to become
economic migrants.117 Per an estimate by the ILO at the time, there were 125 million
international migrants in the world, with that figure expected to “soar” in the years to
come. Unsurprisingly, with mobile migrants comes a nativist backlash against them.
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This anti-immigrant sentiment was visible in Europe in the early and mid 1990s. The
restrictions that accompany this sentiment play directly to the advantage of criminal
people smugglers, or human traffickers, to whom aspiring emigrants must turn for
assistance when their efforts at normal migration are stymied by restrictions.
As in SE Asia, it was (and still is) this convergence of a need to emigrate, but not
the means, and the willingness of unscrupulous people to exploit this, that creates the
dynamic of vulnerability that can so quickly turn a would be worker into a slave. As an
Economist article from August 1995 put it, “as Western Europe puts up shutters against
legal immigration, illegal immigration is rising, and the people-smuggling business is
booming, especially in Eastern Europe, where border controls are chaotic and visa
requirements lax. It is a business that offers no guarantees to its human cargoes; it can
even turn into a new form of slavery.”118 Aside from the ready supply of vulnerable
people that could be easily victimized, the criminal organizations involved in the
burgeoning slave business were also attracted by the enormous and easy profits and the
very low risk.
Trafficking in arms and drugs were relatively well-understood forms of crime by
the 1990s, even if they were expanding into new modalities. Human trafficking was not
well understood, as the frequent conflation of it with mere smuggling indicates.
Trafficking was not universally understood as slavery either. The Economist article cited
above states that in the Czech Republic (both an origin and transit point in the 1990s)
human trafficking was punished as a misdemeanor, while in Poland (equally a source and

118. “The new trade in humans,” The Economist, August 5, 1995.
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transit country) there were no laws against it all. This situation reinforces the point made
previously in the paper that human trafficking’s growth was facilitated by a policy
vacuum in which it was not understood by policy makers, not identified in criminal
statutes, and generally lacked a political character. Again, we see how human trafficking
emerged as a political problem in so far as it was enabled by a failure of policy making.
The same article also illustrates the deeply transnational nature of the crime, as it
was beginning to be understood at the time, describing networks that ran from Central
Asia through Moscow to Norway, from Vietnam and China through Poland, Hungary and
the Czech Republic, the “Balkan route” from the war-torn Balkans through Turkey to
Hungary to Germany, used by Balkans as much by Africans or Chinese. With such
diversified trafficking networks it is easy to see how the ILO’s estimate of 2.5 million
illegal immigrants in Europe in 1993 may in fact have been short by half. The equation is
simple enough: ever-increasing numbers of economic migrants seeking to benefit from
Europe’s wealth and prosperity were running up against a European unwillingness to
accept them.119 As one newspaper headline from May 1993 read, “Refugees pay high
price as Europe raises drawbridge.”120 When the immigrants who did manage to get in
illegally arrived, they found themselves still vulnerable to the victimization of their
smugglers/traffickers, often finding themselves in what was starting to be described in the
media as “human slavery.”
119. This was by no means limited to Europe, a 1995 interagency report from the INS, CIA, FBI and
Coast Guard cited the role that Eastern Europe played as a “major gateway to the US for illegal
immigration,” adding that Moscow had emerged as major transit hub with a transient population of 200,000
illegal migrants at any given time. William Branigin, “US Urges War on the Body Trade,” The Guardian,
December 29, 1995.
120. Andrew Marshall, “Refugees pay a high price as Europe raises the drawbridge,” The Independent,
May 28, 1993.
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Of the multiple forms of enslavement to which irregular immigrants to Europe
found themselves subject to, it was human trafficking for the purposes of sexual
exploitation—mostly of women and girls—that rapidly garnered the larger share of
attention. There are several reasons for this. Bearing in mind that Europe was beset with
economic migrants, it is worth remembering that unemployment in the former Soviet
Union was probably twice as high for women as it was for men. When jobs were
available, they were low paying, even for more educated women. The advertisements for
dancers, waitresses, au pairs, even brides—promising good pay as well as excitement and
glamour in rich Western European cities—that began to bombard Eastern Europeans
were understandably attractive to young women facing unemployment and privation in
drab, broken, former Communist states. Also, somewhat contradictorily given the
notoriously clandestine nature of trafficking, was the visibility with which so many of
these young women found themselves channeled into the sex trade, particularly in the
Netherlands where prostitution was legalized in 1994. By 1993 the Guardian ran an
article proclaiming Amsterdam the “centre for the latest line in the slave trade,” noting
that the workers in this sex-industry were no longer exclusively from Asia or Latin
America, but from Central and Eastern Europe, leading the spokeswoman for a Dutch
government funded NGO providing assistance to sex workers to proclaim the influx of
women from Central and Eastern Europe to be an “epidemic.”121
A more authoritative work supporting this growing conventional wisdom came
from an influential IOM report in 1995.122 The report analyzed case studies of 155

121. Jon Henley, “Sex Trafficking in Europe,” The Guardian, September 10, 1993.
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women who were trafficked into the Netherlands in 1994, finding that approximately
two-thirds of them were from Central or Eastern Europe. Cases of women trafficked
from Central and Eastern Europe had tripled in the Netherlands and doubled in Belgium
in the several years preceding the study. Most were thought by authorities interviewed
for the report to have been trafficked by organized crime groups. Without belaboring this
history, available elsewhere, it is important to note that patterns of human trafficking in
Europe changed dramatically following the collapse of the Soviet Union and its satellite
governments in Eastern Europe. This new phenomenon of trafficking soon attracted the
attention of some national governments in Europe, and of the European Union’s Council,
Commission, and Parliament.

Onto Policy
The early efforts to make human trafficking the subject of European level policy
were headed largely by Anita Gradin, Commissioner for Justice Affairs for the European
Commission and in the European Parliament by Mary Banotti, MEP from Dublin.
Gradin’s efforts seem to have begun in earnest in late 1995, in conjunction with growing
interest in trafficking from within the European Parliament. Banotti led a fact-finding
mission of several MEPs to Netherlands to assess the state of sex trafficking, and was
joined by Gradin. The trip provided an opportunity to elevate trafficking as an issue that
fell under the EU’s purview. Gradin stated that she was “convinced that there is scope
for action on our part,” claiming that the “Commission has competence in a number of
areas, such as the social sector, relations with countries in central and eastern Europe and
122. IOM 1995
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other third countries… we also have the possibilities within the Third Pillar.”123
Of the three courses mentioned by Gradin—the social sector, international
relations, and what was then called the third pillar—the appropriation of the so-called
“social sector” by the EU that would quickly emerge as the most prominent feature of
European-level attempts to combat trafficking.

The most truly transnational approach to

combating trafficking, acting under what was then still referred to as the third pillar of
European integration—justice and home affairs— proved problematic from the
beginning. Variously described as cumbersome or even non-existent by some reporters
at the time, the third pillar covered areas like law enforcement and legal issues, notably
extradition, that some states guard very closely. The third pillar was introduced by the
Treaty on European Union in 1993 and was recently done away with in December 2009
when the Lisbon Treaty came into effect. What was formerly the third pillar of Justice
and Home Affairs is now known as Police and Judicial Cooperation on Criminal Matters.
Although now outdated terms, third pillar and JHA will be used at various points in this
chapter when referring to historical facts and policies made when the third pillar was still
in effect.
Cooperation on third pillar issues was critical to establishing a regional effort
against trafficking. The question of harmonization of national anti-trafficking laws
loomed large. By late 1996 as the EU member states prepared to send their
representatives to the Vienna Conference only Belgium, Netherlands and Austria had
domestic laws against human trafficking. On the rare occasions when other EU countries
tried to prosecute a trafficking case they did so under a mix of inadequate pandering and
123. Patrick Smyth, “Dancers required- no experience necessary,” Irish Times, December 8, 1995.
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prostitution statutes. Citing an illustrative example from her native Sweden, Gradin said
“In Sweden you can get 10 to 12 years in jail for serious drug crimes, but the maximum
for smuggling people is one to two years.''124 This issue was articulated formally in the
Commission’s important November 20, 1996 Communication: “Traffickers will continue
to take advantage of gaps and limits of the national judicial systems unless judicial
cooperation between EU States is improved.”125
The most thorough way to ensure full harmonization of anti-trafficking legislation
between the EU’s members would have been to implement an EU-wide policy that would
have been adopted under the acquis communitaire. This was not an option in the 1990s
because of stiff opposition to third pillar supranationalism, most significantly from
Britain. Third pillar policies were particularly opposed by the Eurosceptic John Major
Government in the UK, which “opposed EU intervention in what it considers internal
matters—such as the security and judicial systems,” and threatened to block proposed
initiatives against sex trafficking and pedophilia. 126
Reflecting the currently understood nature of human trafficking patterns in
Europe, EU anti-trafficking policy is marked by one key characteristic: the EU’s
understanding of human trafficking is very gendered. That is, because of the
preponderance of trafficking for sexual exploitation in Europe and the relatively low
incidence of various forms of slave labor (or at least the limited recognition of it), women
124. Mark Franchetti and Peter Conradi, “Europe’s Roaring Trade in Sex Slaves,” The Sunday Times
(London), June 9, 1996.
125. European Commission, “Communication (96) 567:Trafficking in Women for the Purposes of
Sexual Exploitation; Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament,”
13, http://aei.pitt.edu/6286/ (accessed April 27, 2010).
126. Stephen Bates, “Tracking EU’s ‘Lost’ Children,” Guardian, September 19 1996.
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and children are perceived as being the most frequent victims of human trafficking. For
this reason, human trafficking is more frequently conceptualized as a phenomenon related
to gender and sexual violence. This assumption, accurate or not, has shaped the EU’s
anti-trafficking policies since the mid-1990s when the issue first began to gain
prominence in European policy circles.
Although human trafficking assumed more prominence in 1996, its roots as an
issue within European Union policy can be found in the Treaty of European Union,
adopted in 1992. Trafficking was mentioned in the TEU language introducing the “area
off freedom, security, and justice,” or AFSJ. Title VI, Article 29 of the TEU states:
Without prejudice to the powers of the European Community, the Union's
objective shall be to provide citizens with a high level of safety within an area of
freedom, security and justice by developing common action among the Member
States in the fields of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters and by
preventing and combating racism and xenophobia. That objective shall be
achieved by preventing and combating crime, organised or otherwise, in particular
terrorism, trafficking in persons and offences against children, illicit drug
trafficking and illicit arms trafficking, corruption and fraud…127
The mention is generic, and as is common for governmental entities around the
world when they first become aware of human trafficking, it appears grouped with
terrorism, arms trafficking, and other transnational crimes. As with ASEAN, or even the
United States, expanding the consensus understanding of human trafficking from a
criminal and law and order perspective to a more holistic one takes time. The necessity
of a more holistic and multi-disciplinary, multi-sector approach was articulated a few
years later at the Vienna Conference on Trafficking in Women, held in June 1996 under

127. “Treaty of European Union,” February 7, 1992, Official Journal C 191, Title VI, Article 29.
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the auspices of the European Commission and the IOM. Two key points emerged from
the meeting that shaped the European consensus on human trafficking for years to come.
First, in pursuit of a multidisciplinary approach, the conference brought together
representatives from various sectors such as universities, NGOs, police, immigration
services, and parliamentary and governmental officials. Second, the conference
explicitly characterized European human trafficking as a gendered phenomenon affecting
primarily women.128 These two central points, as well as other proposals and decisions
from the conference were formalized in the key official communication issued from the
Commission to the Council and Parliament on 20 November 1996.
The communication re-enforced and formalized the two key points mentioned
above. Part I of the communication states that “trafficking in women for the purposes of
sexual exploitation,” is a growing crime within Europe and makes explicit the EU’s then
current understanding of human trafficking as a phenomenon that primarily exploited
women for sexual purposes:
Any initiative to combat this form of international crime must devote central
attention to the devastating effect it has on the victims. The rights of women
include their right to have control over, and decide freely on matters relating to
their sexuality… free of coercion, discrimination and violence. The
Communication will thus be limited to the particularly serious abuse of human
rights which is involved in trafficking for sexual purposes.129
Further emphasizing this narrow understanding of trafficking that would inform EU
policy, the communication goes on to formally define trafficking as, “the transport of
128. European Union, “Legislation Summary: ‘Trafficking in women for the purpose of sexual
exploitation,’” under “Employment and Social Policy, Equaltiy Between Men and Women,”
‘http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/employment_and_social_policy/equality_between_men_and_wom
en/l33095_en.htm (accessed April 25, 2010).
129. Commission, Communication, 1996
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women from third countries into the EU for purposes of sexual exploitation.”130 This is a
primitive definition of trafficking, typical of anti-trafficking policy before the TVPA and
the Palermo Protocol codified a more sophisticated understanding of trafficking as
slavery, emphasizing the use of coercion and fraud to enslave people, rather than
emphasizing the more superficial sexual and movement aspects of the phenomenon.
Nonetheless, this “Vienna Consensus” (as I will refer to it) on human trafficking has to be
accepted as a product of its time and appreciated as the basis for increasing policy
responses over the next decade in Europe.
Other pieces of the Communication can also be identified as setting the stage for
European anti-trafficking policy, notably the emphasis on a multi-sector approach
dependent on the heavy involvement of NGOs and the tension between the need to
implement many nuts and bolts anti-trafficking measures at the national level and the
simultaneous need to address this “transfrontier” crime at the supranational level.
According to the Communication, the “main conclusion” of the Vienna Conference
was that a “multidisciplinary and coordinated approach” involving all actors was needed
to effectively tackle trafficking.131 Special consideration was given to the role of NGOs,
saying that the Commission “attaches special importance to the work of NGOs and civil
society in combating trafficking,” because of their demonstrated ability to devise
innovative ways of assisting trafficking victims.132 This emphasis on the capabilities and

130. Ibid.
131. Ibid.
132. Ibid.
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expected role of NGOs would be central to the development of the first Community-wide
anti-trafficking frameworks, STOP and Daphne, discussed below.
Also of note from the Communication was the delineation of national versus
supranational activity in the early stages of the anti-trafficking fight. Likely reflecting the
political impossibility of a third pillar anti-trafficking policy and the simultaneous need
for national level policy harmonization, the Commission noted “a lead responsibility for
the Member States,” but also a need to complement national policies by initiating policy
at the European level.
A September 1998 Communication from the Commission to the Council reflects
the continuation of the Vienna Consensus official understanding of trafficking in Europe
in the late 1990s, saying “Since the Commission's first Communication at the end of 1996
on trafficking in women for the purpose of sexual exploitation, public concern about this
matter and, in the same period, international co-operation have risen considerably.”133
The continued focus on trafficking as primarily a form of gender violence is reflected
when the Communication goes on to say, “In particular, the European Institutions as well
as European NGOs have actively contributed, to the increase in the general awareness of
this unacceptable violation of women’s human rights.”134

133. European Commission, “Communication (98) 726: “For Further Actions in the Fight Against
Trafficking in Women: Communication from the Commission to the Council and European Parliament,”
September 18,1998, http://aei.pitt.edu/3424/01/000575_1.pdf (accessed April 27, 2010)
134. Ibid., Communication 726

83

The Great Europol Controversy
One significant key to the development of transnational crime in Europe is the
dissolution of internal borders brought about by the Schengen agreements in 1985 and
1990, and the institutionalization of the agreements in the Amsterdam Treaty. Although
movement must not be over-emphasized in defining the crime of human trafficking, and
does not need to be present in order for an individual to have been trafficked, the physical
relocation of people across borders is an obvious component of human trafficking and its
cousin offense, facilitated illegal migration (people smuggling). The opening of
European borders brought about by Schengen enormously facilitated the movement
related aspects of human trafficking.135 This created an area of assisted movement for
criminal groups in Western, and later Central Europe, effectively acting as a major factor
in the transnationalization of crime in Europe. As a 2009 Europol fact sheet states, “the
freedom of movement across the EU offered by the Schengen Convention and the EU’s
exposure to organised criminality has never been greater. The removal and relaxation of
internal border controls within the EU has resulted in a significant reduction in
opportunities for many EU law enforcement agencies to intercept traffickers and identify
victims of trafficking (emphasis added).”136
If the Schengen regime benefited commerce and allowed a level of free movement
appropriate to a region entering into monetary union, then it also gave transnational

135. Agnieszka Biegaj, ed., “Ten Years of Europol,” (Hague: Europol Corporate Communications
2009) 16.
136. Europol, “Trafficking in the European Union, a Europol Perspective,”
http://www.europol.europa.eu/publications/Serious_Crime_Overviews/THB_Fact_Sheet_2009%20EN.pdf
(accessed April 29, 2010).
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criminal actors a significant advantage over European law enforcement, which was still
based one level of organization lower, at the national level. This imbalance between the
activity level of the criminals and the activity level of law enforcement meant that the
criminal elements were basically operating above the visibility, as well as the operational
capabilities, of European police forces.
To make matters worse, Schengen also lowered the bar for criminal entry into
transnational, or at least cross-border, activities. As the same fact sheet goes onto say,
“Before ‘Schengen’, only the more sophisticated crime groups could operate at a cross
border level. Thus, the absence of physical border controls provides significant
opportunities for smaller or mid-level groups and individuals to operate in more than one
country.”137 Enlargement into Central and Eastern Europe further exacerbated this
increasing regional vulnerability to trafficking, “In addition, many former ‘markets’ and
source countries are now part of the European Union. Other major source countries such
as the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Belarus, Turkey, Moldova, and the Western Balkans
as a region, are now one border crossing away.”138
The easy intraregional movement created by Schengen functioned as a
“pull” factor in tandem with the socio-economic “push” factors in Central and Eastern
Europe, discussed previously. The freedom of movement created by the Schengen
agreements and Amsterdam contributed to Europe’s vulnerability to human trafficking.
As with the dissolution of Communist Party authority in the East, politics was yet again

137. Ibid., 2
138. Ibid., 2
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creating the basic conditions under which transnational crime (among other nontraditional security threats) would develop in reach and sophistication, and further
entrench itself in the socio-economic fabric of Europe. An individual studying this
problem—whether a police officer, a politician, or an academic—might intuitively
assume that any law enforcement response to this criminal phenomenon would have to
match the criminal practice in its transnational reach. As the political debate in Europe in
1997 shows, the development of a transnational (that is, in terms more appropriate to the
EU, supranational) law enforcement response to transnational crime, including
trafficking, was not a foregone conclusion.
In early 1997 a debate developed concerning the nature of the powers given to the
Europol Drugs Unit, which at the time was a meagerly staffed and funded clearinghouse
for drug related criminal intelligence. The debate was largely conducted at the EU
ministerial meeting in The Hague in April 1997. Netherlands, which held the EU
Presidency at the time, called upon the ministers at the conference to take a number of
steps to assist in combating human trafficking such as allowing trafficking victims to stay
in the country where they were discovered in order to testify, the appointment of
dedicated national rapporteurs for the issue, and that Europol should extend its mandate
beyond drugs intelligence and store trafficking related information in its centralized
databases.139
At the conclusion of the conference the ministers announced that Europol would be
granted so-called “operative” powers that turned what one reporter called an “obscure

139. “Trafficking in Women is Slavery: EU Conference,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 25 April 25, 1997.
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collector of data in the Hague [into] a force directly involved in solving crime.”140 Under
the role established for it at The Hague, Europol would be granted the authority to assist
member state law enforcement agencies by analyzing and disseminating intelligence
providing subject matter expertise, and acting as a liaison element. Journalistic hyperbole
(and the express desire of Germany) aside, Europol was chartered as anything but a
“European FBI.” “Operative” was merely a bureaucratic euphemism for constrained.
Unlike the FBI, Europol would not have law enforcement agents who could operate
unilaterally throughout the EU, let alone do so with powers of arrest. Europol’s role as
an information clearinghouse was greatly expanded, but Europol to this day is basically
an intelligence analysis organization which can only participate in law enforcement
activities in member states with the approval and invitation of national governments.
Moreover, unique for an organization tasked with extensive intelligence analysis, Europol
does not have its own collection assets, relying instead on information of intelligence
value that is fed to it by member state law enforcement entities.
Europol’s constrained nature is representative of the concern about a truly
European police force, expressed most vocally by Britain in 1997. Then British Home
Secretary Michael Howard who claimed that the limited role for Europol was a victory,
stated that giving “’operative powers working together with national authorities,’ to
Europol, as agreed in the declaration, was completely different from giving it ‘operational
powers’, as wanted by Germany.’”141 Howard added, “we do not think it is appropriate

140. Peter Conradi and Stephen Gray, “European FBI Takes First Steps,”, The Sunday Times
(London), April 27, 1997.
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for there to be a European police force.”142
Britain’s objections to creating an operational European police force were not
isolated, but reflected widespread concern among many EU countries about ceding
authority in sensitive third pillar competencies like immigration and law enforcement.
Concerns about ceding home authority to a supranational Justice and Home Affairs pillar
are clearly represented in Europol which is a completely intergovernmental organization,
entirely controlled by Member States, not Brussels.

Intergovernmentalism in Europol
Europol is intergovernmental in both its composition and mandate. Europol’s
roots are in article K1 of the Treaty on European Union, which mandates police
cooperation on drug trafficking, terrorism and other international crime through a
European police force. The Council stood up the Europol Drugs Unit in 1993 and later
that year established its headquarters in The Hague. It was not until October 1, 1998 that
the Europol Convention entered into force and formalized Europol’s existence and role.
It is Article V of the Europol Convention that truly institutionalizes the organization as
intergovernmental and controlled entirely by member states, not only through its
accountability to the Council, but also in its dependence on member states to approve its
involvement in investigations that occur within their territory. National level control over
Europol is considerable, with it being “accountable to the EU Council of Ministers for
Justice and Home Affairs and governed by a Management Board composed of one
141. Ibid., Times
142. Ibid., Times
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representative of each member state.”143 Moreover, the Council appoints Europol’s
Director and three Deputy Directors.
As an information collation and analysis organization, it is understandable that
oversight of Europol focuses on its information storage. To this end a Joint Supervisory
Body comprised of two representatives from each member state is tasked to ensure that
“the rights of the individual are not violated by the storage, processing and utilisation of
the data held by Europol.”144 The Management Board also oversees the Financial
Controller who is appointed by the Management Board to monitor Europol’s income and
expenditures. The Financial Controller is composed of one representative from each
member state and has full authority over Europol’s budget and expenditures. Slightly
over a hundred member state representatives are assigned to provide oversight of an
organization whose full time staff, including liaison officers from member state law
enforcement agencies, numbers around 630.
Article 3 of the Convention establishes Europol’s core competencies to facilitate
information exchange between member states, to provide full cycle intelligence support,
to aid investigations by member states by providing them with intelligence, and maintain
a criminal intelligence database. Extrapolating from these mandated competencies, the
Management Board in 2000, “identified information exchange and operational analysis as
Europol’s core activities and developmental priorities.”145 This was re-iterated in 2003 in
the so-called Rhodes Vision that stated, “the core business of Europol is receiving,
143. Europol, 2009, 24
144. Ibid., Europol, 2009, p24
145. Ibid., Europol, 2009, p27
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exchanging and analysing information and intelligence.”146
Europol’s management and accountability changed significantly on January 1, 2010
when Council Decision 2009/371/JHA took effect.147 The Decision makes Europol a
formal EU institution; subject to the EU’s acquis communitaire as well as normal EU
financial management, drawing its funding from the EU’s general budget and thus
allowing budgetary oversight from the Parliament. This will not change the powers of the
organization. Europol does not have any supranational characteristics in the way that it
is organized or in its mandate.
Europol’s writ is intergovernmental—either bi or multilateral in nature— but not
properly transnational. Because of Schengen and EMU, combined with excellent
transportation and communications networks, everything from people, to money, to
goods, to criminals of all varieties and levels of sophistication, can move freely in the
European Union. The exception to this unparalleled freedom of movement and
operations is European law enforcement and intelligence organizations. This policy
imbalance will likely remain unaddressed for the foreseeable future, given the persistent
sensitivity of EU Member States about ceding sovereignty on third pillar issues.148

146. Ibid., Europol, 2009, p27
147. European Council, “Council Decision 2009/371/JHA, Establishing the European Police Office,”
April 6,2009.
148. Both the European arrest warrant, authorized by Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA and
Eurojust, authorized by Council Decision 2002/187/JHA, are steps in the direction of a coordinated third
pillar. However, both are purely intergovernmental in nature.
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Lisbon and the EPP: Tentative Steps
The enactment of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009 has brought with it a
change that may, in the future, have an enormous impact on how transnational crime is
dealt with in the European Union: the proposed European Public prosecutor.
The EPP is allowed by language in Article 86 of the Lisbon Treaty: “In order to
combat crimes affecting the financial interests of the Union, the Council, by means of
regulations adopted in accordance with a special legislative procedure, may establish a
European Public Prosecutor's Office from Eurojust.”149 The EPP must be established by
unanimous consent in the European Council, with consent of the European Parliament, or
failing that, by an “enhanced cooperation” procedure between the Council, Commission,
and Parliament.150 Currently, the EPP is only a proposed agency.
Although the EPP, once established, could pave the way for supranational action
against a variety of transnational crimes, it was initially proposed to specifically “combat
crimes affecting the financial interests of the Union.”151 Extending the EPP’s writ to other
transnational crimes would require revisions to paragraphs one and two, following the
same unanimous consent procedure in the Council that was required to establish the
office in the first place. Although the language in Lisbon allowing for the establishment
of the EPP is a significant step toward addressing the imbalance between the
supranationalism of crime and law enforcement in the EU, it is important not to overstate
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. Treaty of Lisbon, Article 86, http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=
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the significance of Lisbon’s adoption for the battle against transnational crime in Europe.

STOP and Daphne
The emphasis on trafficking that emerged in 1996 was not mere talk; 1997 proved
to be a busy year for European Union anti-trafficking policy. True to the distinction
made between national policy to be enacted at the individual Member State level, and
transnational policy to be enacted at the European level, the Commission and Parliament
started two distinct anti-trafficking programs in 1996-1997. Both programs adhere very
closely to the 1996 Communication’s recommendation for multidisciplinary and
coordinated action between all relevant players in the anti-trafficking community,
reflecting the Vienna Consensus.
STOP (Stopping Trafficking of Persons) was adopted by Council Joint Action
Initiative 96/700/JAI on 29 November 1996152 to “encourage practical cooperation
between Member State authorities for action against trafficking in humans and the sexual
exploitation of children, by financing activities involving judges, public prosecutors,
police departments, immigration officials, civil servants and other concerned public
services.”153 From early on, the STOP program was weighted toward programs focused

152. European Commission, “Commission Staff Working Paper, Third Report of the Commission to
the European Parliament and the Council on the Implementation of the Grotius, STOP, and Oisin
Programmes,” http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/funding/expired/guidelines/2002/reporttotal_1999_en.pdf
(accessed April 14, 2010).
153. European Commission, Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs, “Report on the
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on Trafficking in
Women for the Purpose of Sexual Exploitation (the Waddington Report),”
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do;jsessionid=98BE2C0DF2D8A9CDF7EFBE8BB0EAF11B.
node1?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A4-1997-0372+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN (accessed
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on stopping child trafficking at the expense of programs countering broader human
trafficking, leading the Commission’s Rapporteur on trafficking to express concern about
the neglect of other kinds of trafficking.154
Accompanying and augmenting STOP and STOP II were the Daphne Initiative
and Programmes. The Daphne Initiative was authorized by the European Parliament in
1997 with an initial budget of 3 million euros and ran from 1997 to 1999. In 2000 the
Initiative was replaced by the Daphne Programme, a much more robust piece of policy
which was allocated 20 million euros for the 2000-2003 period. The Daphne Initiative
adhered very closely to the 1996 emphasis on recruiting civil society into the antitrafficking fight, limiting its grant disbursements to NGOs. This changed with the
introduction of the Daphne Programme in 2000, when local public agencies were also
allowed to apply for Daphne money as project leaders rather than just partners.
Additionally, in recognition of the fact that regional trafficking was not bound by the
EU’s borders, EFTA/EAA and CEEC countries could also apply for Daphne Programme
funding.
Intended to complement the STOP and AGIS programs that focused on human
and child trafficking at the national level, Daphne sought to establish “networks at
European level between NGOs and promoting co-operation between NGOs and the
appropriate authorities,” exchange information and best practices, and raise public
awareness. What separates Daphne from its sister programs at the Member State level is
a very broad mandate that is not limited to trafficking at all. Daphne explicitly targets all
April 14, 2010).
154. Ibid., Report, Section 5.1, 1997
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kinds of violence, not just sexual violence whether linked to human trafficking in the EU,
or not. Daphne’s linkage to trafficking should be viewed as the funding that it provides
to NGOs that support the rehabilitation and reintegration of victims of violence, notably
victims of human trafficking. This role coincides well with the victim centered approach
that was gaining prevalence in Europe in the late 1990s and that would be simultaneously
codified by the both the US and the UN in 2000, though a mandate to cover rehabilitation
was only added after the 1997 Rapporteur’s report criticizing its initial absence.
By the time Daphne II drew to a close in 2004, over 40 million euros had been
spent funding 303 programs, staffed by hundreds of workers from all sectors of society,
and assisting untold thousands of people in and outside of Europe. Although a seemingly
impressive program, it is not Daphne’s accomplishments that this paper is concerned
about, but its character as a policy set. Daphne is an inherently supranational policy set.
The Daphne Initiative in 1997 was ushered into existence under the leadership of
European Commissioner Anita Gradin, in response to a widespread and heightened
awareness of violence against women—and following the high profile murders of young
girls in Belgium in 1996—also of children. Nestled with this broad concern about
violence toward women and children was the more specific, but still nascent, awareness
of human trafficking of women and children for the purposes of sexual exploitation
within Europe.
Introduced by Gradin under the Commission’s Justice and Home Affairs
competence, the Daphne Initiative sought to bring together NGOs from at least two
Member States in a conscious effort to make the resulting project transnational. The
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Commission’s goal with Daphne was not just to create programs in more than one
Member State at a time, but also to create programs that would develop a Europe-wide
capacity to gather information on violence against women and children and establish best
practices. The Community-wide focus of the Initiative and Program can be seen in 2 of
the 4 goals of the 2000-2003 Daphne Program, which sought to “extract and deduce
policy issues, wherever possible, from the work achieved by funded projects, with the
aim of suggesting common policies on violence at Community level,” and to
“disseminate, on a Europe-wide scale, good practices.”155
A pan-regional character for Daphne and its funded programs was consciously
sought after by the Commission, and submissions for funding were judged on whether or
not they were sufficiently transnational, or European. A statement from a 2004 EU
policy review document titled “The Daphne Experience” clearly illustrates this strong
desire to develop transnational institutions under a supranational authorization:
“Submissions continued to fail because they were local and did not attempt to explore the
potential of ‘European-ness’. However, those projects that did make efforts to ‘be
European’ achieved some success and, as monitoring visits, final reports and evaluations
demonstrated, there began to be a growing understanding of the value of truly ‘European’
action.”156 “The Daphne Experience” report went on to say that, “Although much
remained to be learned about what being a ‘European project’ entailed, there were clear
signs by 2000 that many organisations had grown, as a result of Daphne support, into
155. European Commission, Commission Final Report to the European Parliament and the Council on
the Daphne Program 2000-2003 (Brussels: Commission, 2004).
156. European Commisson Directorate for Freedom, Justice and Security, The Daphne Experience
(Brussels: Commission, 2005).
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organisations whose impact was European rather than national or even local [emphasis
added].”157 This is a significant statement because it indicates that transnationally
focused, issue-oriented policy was developing a transnational, non-governmental
response capacity where none had previously existed. Daphne’s purpose of developing a
European response to violence against women (and its related topic of trafficking) was
apparently successful.
Daphne III was authorized by the European Council and Parliament in June 2007
by Council Decision 779. The program will run through 2013 as a subsidiary portion of
the broader Fundamental Rights and Justice General Programme. As with its three
Daphne predecessor programs, Daphne III seeks to “to contribute to the protection of
children, young people and women against all forms of violence.”158 As before, human
trafficking is viewed as one especially serious form of violence, among many, and as
before the crime is viewed as a primarily gender-based phenomenon, “the estimated
number of trafficking victims in the EU is over 100.000 per year, and 80% of these are
women and girls.”159 Additionally, the Commission’s efforts to ensure a communitywide policy also continued, and were reflected explicitly in language in Decision 779:
Since the objectives of this Decision, namely to prevent and combat all forms of
violence against children, young people and women, cannot be sufficiently
achieved by the Member States because of the need for an exchange of information
at the Community level and for the Community-wide dissemination of good
practices, and can be better achieved at Community level due to the need for a

157. Ibid.
158. European Commission, “Prevent and combat violence against children, young people and women
and to protect victims and groups at risk,”
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/funding/daphne3/wai/funding_daphne3_en.htm (accessed April 10, 2010)
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coordinated and multidisciplinary approach and by reason of the scale or impact of
the programme, the Community may adopt measures, in accordance with the
principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty. In accordance with the
principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Decision does not go
beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives.160

Daphne III was a specific program that itself was part of a larger policy effort in
2007, the General Programme called “Fundamental Rights and Justice.” Other General
Programmes were also approved by Council decision in 2007, notably the General
Programme on Security and Safeguarding Liberties, and its subsidiary Specific
Programme for the Prevention of and Fight against Crime in Council Decision
2007/125/JHA. Decision 125 recognized transnational crime, like violence against
women and children, as a problem requiring concerted action at the Community level to
supplement and harmonize individual Member State policies. In language very closely
mirroring Decision 779, the Council writes:
Since the objectives of this Decision, particularly the prevention of and the fight
against organised and transborder crime, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the
Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or impact of the
programme, be better achieved at the level of European Union, the Council may
adopt measures in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article
5 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, made applicable to the
Union by Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the
principle of proportionality, as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty establishing the
European Community, this Decision does not go beyond what is necessary to
achieve those objectives.161

160. European Parliament, “Decision 779/2007/EC,” http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32007D0779:EN:NOT (accessed April 14, 2010).
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Human trafficking was not always divorced from a transnational crime context the
way it was in the Daphne policy sets. In a 2007 Council decision, human trafficking is
mentioned as a type of transnational crime. Article 2 of Decision 125 explicitly mentions
human trafficking as a subject of the Fight Against Crime Special Programme, saying:
“The Programme shall contribute to a high level of security for citizens by preventing and
combating crime, organised or otherwise, in particular terrorism, trafficking in persons
and offences against children, illicit drug trafficking and illicit arms trafficking,
corruption and fraud.162 The Fight Against Crime Special Program was intended by the
Council to replace the AGIS program. Given its birth as a council product, the intent of
the Special Programme is very much one of intergovernmental coordination.163 Despite
this, elements from supranationalism did creep into it.
Daphne language is further repeated in the Fight Against Crime decision in
subsequent articles, for instance Article 4b states that: “transnational projects, which shall
involve partners in at least two Member States, or at least one Member State,”164 and
Article 4d states that “operating grants for non-governmental organizations pursuing on a
non-profit basis objectives of the Programme on a European dimension.”165
Decision 125 almost exactly mimics the multi-sector and multidisciplinary
2010).
162. Ibid., 2007/125/JHA, Article 2, 2
163. European Council, “Specific programme: preventing an combating crime (2007-2013),”
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/fight_against_organised_crime/l33263_en
.htm accessed May 31, 2010)
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language of the previous Daphne authorizations in Article 5, stating “the Programme is
destined for law enforcement agencies, other public and/or private bodies, actors and
institutions, including local, regional and national authorities, social partners, universities,
statistical offices, non-governmental organisations, public-private partnerships and
relevant international bodies.”166
Finally, like the Daphne and STOP programs, the Fight Against Crime Special
Programme would also be monitored by the Commission and assessed for effectiveness,
as mandated in Article 15:
1. The Programme shall be monitored regularly in order to follow the
implementation of activities carried out there under.
2. The Commission shall ensure regular, independent and
external evaluation of the Programme.
3. The Commission shall submit to the European Parliament
and the Council:
(a) an annual presentation on the implementation of the
Programme.167
Human trafficking, while not the subject of its own exclusive piece of policy at
the European level, is none the less addressed by the EU— Commission, Council, and
Parliament—in a continuous and gradually expanded fashion from 1997 onwards,
following the subject’s serious introduction into EU policymaking after the 1996 Vienna
Conference. The EU’s view off human trafficking may be criticized for its heavy and
intentional gender bias, though this gender bias should not be assumed to be an attempt to
ignore male victims of trafficking in Europe. On the contrary, the female-oriented bias in
EU anti-trafficking policy reflects what is widely assumed to be the disproportionately

166. Ibid., 2007/125/JHA, Article 5-1, 3
167. Ibid., 2007/125/JHA, Article 15, 6
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gendered nature of human trafficking in Europe where approximately 80% of victims are
assumed to be women enslaved for purposes of sexual exploitation. In light of this, the
gender bias that exists in EU anti-trafficking policy may be largely explained.
Nonetheless, this female focus does risk institutionalizing a permanent underestimation
of male victim hood in Europe and should be questioned accordingly.
The second notable feature of the EU’s anti-trafficking policy is that it clearly
understands human trafficking as a transboundary issue affecting all of Europe. Brussels
seems to understand that looking at trafficking only as a national issue removes it from its
inherently transnational context and makes a full appreciation of the crime’s scope
impossible. The information sharing and best practices exchanges conducted under STOP
and Daphne auspices are a direct attempt to prevent this tunnel vision and to ensure that a
field-tested corpus of best practices is available throughout the region, for the benefit of
all practitioners in the fight against trafficking.
Third, the EU’s understanding of human trafficking and its approach to fighting it
has been from the start a multidisciplinary and multi-sector effort that recruits expertise
from all quarters of society to fight trafficking. This approach should be viewed as a
strength in any effort to combat a crime that is as famously nebulous and variable as
human trafficking. The European multidisciplinary approach also makes sense in light of
this paper’s understanding of human trafficking (and non-traditional security threats in
general) as a subject that can fruitfully be analyzed from multiple academic perspectives.
Related to the third characteristic, is the central role that NGOs play in European
anti-trafficking efforts. As in other regions, European NGOs represent a deep well of
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practical expertise on human trafficking (and all forms of social violence, as included in
the Daphne model). Moreover, NGOs are geographically dispersed and expert in the
intricacies of socio-criminal patterns in their locale. By funding the activities of these
local actors (though across borders, as required by Daphne rules) the EU is able to
conduct direct action without developing a massive bureaucracy at local levels for the
execution of one policy set. NGOs give the European anti-trafficking response agility
and specificity. The NGO-centered response of the Daphne policy sets is also a way for
the Commission to successfully develop a supranational response to a transnational
problem.

An Unresolved Question of Causality
It is plausible that the Commission was actually the transnational entrepreneur
here, creating a civil society-led mechanism of transnational governance. Put differently,
the Commission knew full well that it did not have the mandate or means to create
supranational governmental mechanisms to address a transboundary security problem
like trafficking, so it recruited an innocuous proxy who could simultaneously raise
awareness of the problem, (thus generating pressure on national level authorities to act)
and also offer the means of action in the form of NGOs funded with Commission money.
Concurrence with this Commission-presented course would be inescapable for the
national governments: the Daphne model of NGO recruitment offered a “solution” to the
problem which required neither direct action (that is, funding) from the Member State,
nor acquiescence to Commission supranationalism creeping into the ever-sensitive third
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pillar.
A conceptual re-arrangement along the lines of the kind described by Keck and
Sikkink did take place in Europe in 1996 on the issue of human trafficking. Sorting out
who led the conceptual re-arrangement, or change of discursive positions, on trafficking
that seems to have taken place in 1996 is difficult, and is complicated by the way the
issue was pushed from within the EU’s Commission, and to a lesser degree Parliament,
by Justice Commissioner Anita Gradin and MEP Mary Banotti, respectively. Gradin’s
apparent claims to ownership of the Vienna Conference provide little indication that she
was convinced or pushed by advocacy networks:
A year and a half ago, I organised a major conference in Vienna on Trafficking in
women, in co-operation with the International Organisation of Migration and the
Austrian government. Representatives from all governments in the European
Union, as well as the applicant states, participated, together with nongovernmental organisations, experts and researchers. The recommendations from
this conference served as a basis for the Commission's Action Plan against
Trafficking in Women for Sexual Exploitation, that was presented in November
last year.168

The presence of NGOs is not being denied, but the question of their policy
initiation is. In a different press release Gradin said, “The project DAPHNE is running
for the first year. It is intended for non-governmental organisations working against
violence and exploitation of children and women. We have met with an enormous
interest, and have barely been able to support ten per cent of all applications. To me, this
shows the need of the activities of the NGOs in this field.”169 Again, NGOs are present

168. Anita Gradin, “Speech at the Vienna Conference,” (speech, Conference on Trafficking in Women,
Vienna, June 10, 1996).
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and highly valued, but they are portrayed as responding to opportunities offered them by
the Commission, and not necessarily driving the creation of those opportunities.
The question of initiative is key here; the EU under Gradin’s own advocacy seems
to have demonstrated a lot of initiative to tackle a problem that it had been struggling to
understand for the previous five years. This does not seem to be a case of an advocacy
network having to generate interest in policy makers by arousing popular anger over the
issue. A more cooperative dynamic was probably in effect, perhaps even a symbiotic
relationship where the European Commission and the NGOs used each other’s means to
effect a transnational policy response that would not have been possible with purely
governmental or non-governmental means.

Final Thoughts on Functionalism in the EU Response
The EU’s anti-trafficking policy response is a bit of a phenomenon in of itself.
Superficially, the EU’s anti-trafficking response, dominated as it is by the STOP and
Daphne policy programs, might seem to miss the mark on being suitably functionalist.
This judgment might be made by an observer who notes that the Commission itself does
not directly employ or control the people who do the bulk of anti-trafficking work at the
European level. This would be inaccurate. A deeper consideration of the EU’s
recruitment of civil society as the proxy by which Commission money is spent to combat
trafficking (among other ills) is perfectly consistent with Mitrany’s assumption that
issues lacking political, ideological, or conflictual aspects would be handed over to

169. Anita Gradin, “Trafficking in Women,” (speech, Conference of the International Association of
Women Judges, Rome, 28-29 November 1997).
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technical specialists. There is no requirement that these technical specialists be
government employees. The key to functionalism is simply that the people with the
necessary specialist knowledge to address a given problem be tasked with doing so. This
has plainly happened in Europe. The pool of specialist knowledge required to assist
victims of trafficking was found in the “social sector.” The recruitment of this civil
society expertise has given the EU the kernel of a regional anti-trafficking response, and
should be recognized as a fine policy accomplishment.
However, the civil society-as-proxy response is only half of the equation.
Admitting the usefulness of the civil society response does not mean ignoring the
enormous gap that exists in the law enforcement end of the anti-trafficking response.
Right now the EU really only has a regional policy set to address what happens after
people are trafficked. As long as a European FBI remains politically impossible, the
criminals will have the upper hand, and options to prevent, let alone decrease human
trafficking in Europe will be sharply limited. This is a failure of supranationalism and
integration, but not necessarily a refutation of functionalism. Europol, though lacking
sufficient mandate to capture or kill traffickers, is nonetheless a steadily developing pool
of apolitical technical specialists engaging in highly technical work. Moreover, if their
writ is limited, it is still solidly transnational and regional. Functionalist principles have
been applied where political actors in Brussels have found it possible to apply them.
Europol’s evolution is not complete, but its nearly twenty year lifespan so far does seem
to reflect Mitrany’s expectations that functional cooperation would expand in response to
the ever increasing difficulties of modern political life.
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Advocacy Networks As a Model for EU Anti-Trafficking Policy
The policy history and characteristics discussed above are consistent with the
basic expectations of Mitranian functionalism. However, the prominence of nongovernmental organizations in the development of the EU’s regional anti-trafficking
policies seemed to offer an interesting opportunity to try to apply a less well-known and
narrower, more specialized model. The concept of transnational advocacy networks is
discussed at length by Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink in their 1998 book Activists
Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics.
Keck and Sikkink define these advocacy networks as “networks of activists,
distinguishable largely by the centrality of principled ideas or values in motivating their
formation.”170 These networks are assumed to be of significance internationally and
domestically, because by “building new links among actors in civil societies, states, and
international organizations, they multiply the channels of access to the international
system.”171 According to Keck and Sikkink these networks and their component actors,
fall outside of the rationalist expectations of liberal internationalism because they are
motivated by deeply held ethical values rather than wealth, power, professional esteem,
or other rationalist motivations.
A characteristic of the advocacy networks that aligns with the human trafficking
policy situation in Europe in the 1990s is that “a transnational advocacy network includes
those relevant actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by

170. Keck, Margaret and Sikkink, Kathryn, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in
International Politics (Cornell University Press, 1998), 1.
171. Ibid., 1
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shared values, a common discourse, and sense exchanges of information and services.
Such networks are most prevalent in issue areas characterized by high value content and
informational uncertainty.”172
Information uncertainty certainly characterized the debate about human
trafficking in European policy circles in the early and mid-1990s. Definitions of human
trafficking were not standardized, and as discussed above, often non-existent. Human
trafficking was irregularly and incompletely separated from smuggling. The link
between sex trafficking and legal sex industries, for instance in the Netherlands, was not
fully understood, as evidenced by pushes to legalize prostitution. Some European
national governments did not even recognize human trafficking as a widespread criminal
phenomenon. Informational uncertainty contributed on the supply end of the trafficking
routes as well. The young women who were most vulnerable to being trafficked in the
early 1990s were often too isolated in their post-Soviet societies to be aware of the threat
that was targeting them.
High value content can be understood as the degree to which values-based
judgments inform debate about a given issue. Human trafficking is unquestionably a
high value content topic in the sense that a number of non-controversial normative value
statements are associated with it. For instance, few people would question normative
statements condemning slavery, rape, sexual abuse, and brutal workplace environments.
Few people would disagree with the general assertion that such wrongs should be
combated. The high value content of an issue like human trafficking gives activists a

172. Ibid., 2
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stable moral high ground from which to work, and an easy source of leverage which they
can use to influence policy makers. No politician or bureaucrat wants to be known for
resisting policy action that would help rape victims or child laborers. The value content
of an issue like human trafficking and its associated evils of rape and slavery likely keep
it alive as a policy issue despite the apparent difficulty of making policy that effectively
combats it.
As communicators, activists raise awareness of issues that may not have visibility
in policy circles or that may not be uniformly understood by policymakers. Advocacy
networks “contribute to changing perceptions that both state and societal actors may have
of their identities, interests, and preferences, to transforming their discursive positions,
and ultimately to changing procedures, policies, and behavior.”173 In the context of 1990s
Europe this transformation of “discursive positions” occurred at the June 1996 Vienna
Conference that was sponsored by the European Commission and the IOM. What I have
termed the “Vienna Consensus” emerged as a commonly held understanding of human
trafficking by European-level policy makers, which went on to directly inform the
specifics of policymaking in the following years.
On a related point, “activists interpret facts and testimony, usually framing issues
simply, in terms of right and wrong, because their purpose is to persuade people and
stimulate them to act.”174 Persuasion is an important, even central, aim for most NGOs,
and for all activists. Keck and Sikkink provide an example of how women's rights
activists in the mid-1970s were able to reframe the then unknown practice of female
173. Ibid., 3
174. Ibid., 19
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genital circumcision into “female genital mutilation,” thus invalidating the practice as a
cultural or familial prerogative and recasting it as an act of sexual violence against
women. Such a level of conceptual rearrangement and persuasion was also necessary in
clarifying the trafficking phenomenon for Western policy-makers in the 1990s.
A key act of the conceptual rearrangement was separating human trafficking (or
more narrowly, in the European context of the time, sex trafficking) from voluntary
illegal migration, or smuggling. A specific policy argument that developed from this
goal was to allow trafficking victims (women in the case of the discussion then) to
remain legally in the destination country to receive rehabilitation assistance and to testify
against their victimizers. These concessions would not have been available to a
smugglee, but were argued to be due to victims of severe and traumatic violence from
traffickers. Such concessions are a universal standard today, owing to their codification
in the UN’s 2000 Palermo Protocol. This previously “unheard” issue was injected into
policy-making consciousness by NGOs and activists, who worked in rehabilitating
trafficking victims and expressed policy wishes based on difficulties they had
encountered in caring for their charges.
That a conceptual rearrangement took place at Vienna seems fairly clear, but we
may be erring in ascribing this too much to the participation of advocacy networks and
their discourse changing activities. By assuming the applicability of Keck and Sikkink’s
model to the human trafficking issue in Europe, we may be supposing a level of NGO or
activist entrepreneurship that was not present in the EU in the early and mid-1990s. We
may be facing an issue of causality. Did the way the EU structured its Daphne policy set
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recruit NGOs and activists who had previously been either passive or unorganized (or
non-existent), or did the Commission structure Daphne specifically to recruit an already
latent and semi-developed pool of expertise and labor into transnational governance
activities?
The pre-existing transnational nature of the NGOs in 1997 may be somewhat
called into question by the fact that many of the first wave of applications for grant
money were turned down for failing to meet the Commission's explicit criterion that the
proposed work be “transnational” (or at least multi-state) in nature. Did the dangling
carrot of EU money in fact prompt the development of international linkages and
transnational competency where neither had previously been very developed? If so, this
would not be entirely congruent with Keck and Sekkink’s hypothesis.
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Chapter Five: Conclusion

Trafficking, perhaps more than other types of transnational crime, seems to be
perfectly nebulous, a blob that sprawls across borders, regions, and continents, slipping
through whatever cracks exist in governance and latching onto whatever weakness or
wants may make a person vulnerable. Given this complexity and nebulousness,
trafficking has steadily expanded itself as the 21st century’s modality of slavery, with
little regard for the increasingly sophisticated and coordinated responses from more and
more states and their non-governmental partners. If supranationalism in governance (or
government, perhaps) is a variable that will one day stem the growth of this transnational
threat, it may still be a while coming. The only firm conclusion that this paper can draw
about the efficacy of supranational governance as a way to thwart this transnational
threat, is that the mechanisms of supranationalism (primarily governmental) will need to
develop more first.
In so far as Daphne is basically a transnational policy set that was initiated and
funded by the EU’s supranational bureaucracy—the Commission—then some of the
expected supranationalism-transnationalism symmetry discussed in the introduction is
present in the EU’s policy response to human trafficking. However, this symmetry is
incomplete because it extends only to policy that deals with human trafficking after the
fact. The supranational response does not extend to a preemptive set of policies, which in
this instance would basically center on law enforcement activity. If this null finding fails
to support the hypothesis, it at least does not contradict or invalidate it. In fact if there is a
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demonstrated shortfall in the expected degree of policy supranationalism, and this
shortfall is linked to the failure to curtail the threat, then hypothesis remains a valid open
question. The hypothesis can apparently only be conclusively supported or invalidated by
the actual implementation of a supranational law enforcement response in the EU, or
someday, even ASEAN.
The recruitment of civil society by the EU in order to execute technical, issue
oriented actions has been shown to be a useful way to work around member state
concerns over ceding authority to the EU on certain issues. Civil society functionalism is
a kind of functionalism by proxy, and has been a valuable and interesting development in
the EU’s supranational governance.
Functionalism by proxy may be similarly useful to ASEAN. Because of
ASEAN’s still strict norm of non-intervention, it is difficult to imagine member states
supporting a “Southeast Asian FBI,” for instance. Just as a European one was sharply
opposed in the 1990s. It is not difficult to imagine a more economically and financially
integrated ASEAN, a decade or two in the future, finding the same kind of limitations on
functional cooperation that the EU faces today. Truly difficult and sensitive issues will
not be able to be depoliticized enough to transfer from the national-political to the
transnational-functional.
ASEAN, which may always have a more acute supranationalism deficit than the
EU, may find that formalizing the large amount of non-governmental expertise and
capability latent in the region could provide it with regional governance tools with which
to address transnational threats. If we hope that ASEAN can duplicate some of Europe’s
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success with the functionalism by proxy model, then we can also expect them to
encounter many of the same limitations.
Even though the paper’s hypothesis was not supported by the research and
findings, this paper still successfully tested the hypothesis. The null result suggests that a
higher degree of supranationalism in regional governance is not, by itself, sufficient to
ensure a commensurately supranational response to a transnational security threat. In
hindsight, the expectation of the supranationalism dividend was overly simplistic.
Supranationalism has to exist in key areas of functional cooperation. It must be targeted.
This paper was also intended as a partially exploratory effort to link transnational
policy issues to correspondingly transnational governmental responses, or to the apparent
lack thereof. The misalignment between state-based regional responses to transnational
security threats and the cross-border nature of these threats is an important question
raised by this paper. The capacity for transnational threats to thrive and grow in scope
and severity in the face of national efforts to counter them raises the important question
of the necessity of developing supranational governance. An implied question is whether
the runaway nature of many transnational security threats is an early signal event of the
coming obsolescence of nation-states. That is a very big conceptual leap to make based
on this paper, but it is one that I have thought about throughout this project.
The writing of this paper also uncovered several potentially fruitful avenues for
further research. The question of supranational governance by proxy was raised by the
apparent reliance of the EU on non-governmental and/or activist groups to do much of
the day to day, practitioner level work in addressing human-trafficking (among other
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social ills) through its Daphne series of policies. NGOs may be studied as a “shortcut” to
transnational governance that sidesteps the issues of sovereignty that complicate the
imposition of supranational governance by governmental, formal means. Due to the
highly technical nature of non-traditional security threats, it is also possible that the
subject matter experts required of functional cooperation will be found increasingly in
non-governmental organizations. If this were the case then NGO recruitment and
partnership by regional governmental organizations could provide a way to combat not
only trafficking, but also other non-traditional security threats. An even more interesting
question is if the future of functional cooperation will be more and more nongovernmental in nature.
The EU case, specifically the issues surrounding Europol’s blocked expansion in
1997, also raised the tension between wanting to fight transnational threats and the
anxiety that states feel over surrendering the necessary competencies to create a
supranational response to these threats. Threats, whether from criminals or pollution,
exist without regard for state borders or jurisdictions. States (and their citizens) will be at
a disadvantage until they learn to respond in kind. How states will reconcile their
precious sovereignty with an increasingly apparent need to disregard it is a question that
will remain relevant and pressing for decades to come.
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